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1.1 The Study of Elections and Voting
Elections are aggregation processes, and a majority of electoral analysis is bound
to focus upon looking at electoral returns as a starting point at the least. Electoral
outcomes are determined when the votes are tallied up in a given electoral unit,
and such an outcome of elections constitutes the natural unit of analysis. For ex-
ample, it could be either how the electoral fate of an incumbent party is swayed
by the economic conditions over time nationwide, or how a given electoral dis-
trict’s peculiar configuration explains any electoral outcomes unique to that dis-
trict. Strongly embedded in our language are such phrases as “how the country
decided ...,” or “how the district has chosen ...,” and studying elections with ag-
gregate information makes sense.
Voting is also an individual behavior. It is neither the country nor the districts
that decide, but the voters that make choices. Analyzing elections and explaining
the outcomes would necessarily involve a certain theory of voters.
Particularly meaningful in this context are the successes and achievements that
survey methodology brought into the study of elections since the end of the Sec-
ond World War. Epitomized in the American National Election Studies (ANES)
1
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and followed by many survey studies in various democracies, this research method
addresses questions on the psychological factors and rational calculus that work
within voters.
Survey research combined with powerful statistical tools has produced per-
haps the most enduring successes in quantitative electoral studies. Thanks to
the ingenuity in the design and subsequent analyses of the collective body of the
ANES, we now know more about the American voter than we did half a century
ago. Also, many concepts and methodology developed through the ANES experi-
ence provide an excellent benchmark for the study of voters in other democracies
as well, as is evidenced in the electoral studies conducted in many countries. For
example, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) includes election
survey studies from more than thirty countries in the world, with an eye towards
unifying the study of voting behavior in the comparative politics context.
Survey measures are by no means perfect. Respondents are known to lie, for-
get, or misinterpret the questions when they face an interviewer or when they
fill in a questionnaire. Yet, the simple virtue of directly measuring the voter’s
behavior, intention, and characteristics enables the researcher to examine the di-
rect linkage between them. This exactly is the reason why survey studies have
dominated electoral studies in the past fifty years with so many successes.
1.2 Limitations of Survey Studies in Studying Electoral Politics
Even though survey studies have opened up opportunities to investigate the
psyche and attributes of the voters, there are inherent limitations that come with
the approach. These are not simple problems—sometimes the problems would
justify the usage of aggregate data in electoral studies over survey data.
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First of all, survey data are limited in availability. Most importantly, since the
collection of survey data at a large scale started relatively recently, it is impossible
to address questions directed at individual-level relationships on elections that
predate the Second World War. If we move outside of the United States and look
into other countries with shorter history of election survey studies, the researcher,
when solely dependent on survey data, is bound to only a few very recent elec-
tions.
Including the canonical examples of how and why German voters in the Third
Reich supported the National Socialist Party, or how the Republican Party rose
to power in the US, studies on many elections of historical importance would just
have to resort to aggregate data: there simply is no individual-level data regarding
these elections.
Secondly, in addition to the simple availability issue, survey data are subject
to questions on their general reliability. To study elections under undemocratic
or semi-democratic regimes would be difficult since survey data on these elec-
tions are scarce, and even when they are available, reliable data are even scarcer.
Take the example of South Korean elections: under the authoritarian regime in
the early 1980s, the conduct of asking and publishing the electoral intention of the
voters before the election was pronounced illegal since it could “skew the electoral
results.” Moreover, we do not know well how much of their true political prefer-
ences the respondents would be willing to reveal under such a political climate.
In fact, the reliability issue is more of a problem in new democracies where the
history of survey study runs shallow. Without the benefits of accumulated skills
and experience, many problems plague electoral studies in different countries.
Questionnaires are merely blind translations of ANES sometimes, featuring ques-
4
tions on “foreign” issues such as abortion in native languages; to make matters
worse, they change often and drastically.
Election survey studies in such countries will continue to improve and help us
understand the voters in new or semi-democracies. However, at the same time,
there is no reason to exclude aggregate level analysis to at least complement the
study of voters through survey data.
Aggregate data face fewer challenges in terms of availability and reliability
problems. Exactly because elections are determined by the tallied votes, aggregate
results of elections in the past are well archived, if not always in an electronic form
that is readily available. The availability issue is not so much of a question under
authoritarian regimes or in new democracies; barring election fraud, the reliability
issue seems like a minor concern as well with aggregate data. Campaign processes
may be questionable, but counting votes is usually not.
In fact, it is usually the case that efficient bureaucracies under authoritarian
regimes meticulously collect and archive detailed electoral returns—often con-
scious of the legitimacy issue within the electoral process—as well as detailed
census information of the voters. It would be unwise to disregard the entire body
of rich and available information that aggregate data provide when survey studies
are plagued with availability and reliability problems.
Thirdly, additional to the availability and reliability issues, there are inherent
limitations to the survey approach addressing the dynamic aspect of elections
(Achen and Shively 1995). For example, there is the question of whether surveys
can detect electoral realignment of voters over time. By design, surveys cannot
directly address the question of how electoral processes develop over time.
Surveys will usually give a clear depiction of the cross-sectional picture of the
5
electorate at a given time or in one election where the researcher will look into
the static relationship that shapes the electoral choice of the voter. It would be
hard to capture the impact of the past on current elections, since the past can not
be measured or is difficult to measure in the cross-sectional snapshots surveys
usually provide.
Measurements regarding past elections in the survey context can be achieved
by adding questions asking the voters to recall back a few elections, or can be
implemented in the context of panel studies. However, there is a limit to how
long a time span can be measured looking at the history of the voters, and even
when possible, there are additional problems related to panel attrition (Jennings
and Markus 1984). The accuracy of recalling the past is also a problem.
Except in rare cases, survey studies will not allow the researcher to investigate
the long-term dynamics of elections. This problem will prevent researchers, if
they rely solely upon survey studies, from investigating elections from a historical
standpoint of view, where changes are not always immediate but subtle.
In contrast, aggregate data can provide the researcher with opportunities to
study the electoral dynamics directly. Regardless of the levels of aggregation, tem-
poral variation of electoral returns can be put into a long time-series, which will
constitute the major dependent variable of interest.1 Explaining it with past elec-
tions and other temporally varying characteristics of the aggregate unit directly
matches the data structure.
So far, I have discussed the problems that individual level survey data present,
and highlighted the comparative advantage of aggregate data in terms of their
availability, reliability, and ability to deal with electoral dynamics. However, it
1It should be noted that at certain levels of aggregation, the problem of boundary changes, such as electoral redistricting,
can be a problem in this regard.
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is important to note that studying individual level relationships using aggregate
data—ecological inference—comes with many problems, too. The discussion in
the next section considers these difficulties.
1.3 The Ecological Inference Problem
In previous sections, I have spelled out several simple points: that individual
level relationships in the study of elections are important and interesting; that
survey data directly address this relationship and have greatly contributed to the
scholarship on elections; and that under certain circumstances, it is usually the
case that survey data are simply not available and the aggregate level information
is all there is left for us to analyze. In this section, I will discuss the problems re-
lated to using aggregate data to infer individual-level relationships: this is known
as the ecological inference problem.
Consider an individual-level relationship that the researcher is studying, namely
how an individual’s past electoral choice, x, is related to her current vote, y. One
would write a model such as
yi = f (xi, ·) (1.1)
and would study the particular function f that describes the voter transition from
one election to another.
However, this relationship, or the function f , will not hold at the aggregate
level, since both variables will be transformed by unknown forces—”nature”—
that determine, for instance, why and how certain people live close to one another.
It is possible to think of an aggregating function, G, that sorts and selects individ-
uals into different groups. For example, Yj = G(yij) and Xj = G(xij), where Xj
and Yj would denote the aggregation of individual-level variables, xijand yij, in
7






Then we can see that the relationship that we are mostly interested in, f , will be
hard to trace back with aggregate information. Recovering the original micro-
level relationship, f , using X and Y by adding assumptions about how G works,
would be the definition of ecological inference. What might be a simple con-
nection with data on individuals becomes a difficult inferential question with
grouped data. Admittedly, this is a tough challenge to overcome, yet at the same
time, as was argued above, it may be the only investigation tool left for the re-
searcher.
Another difficulty with equation (1.2) is that it is challenging and perhaps fruit-
less to look for a general solution to ecological inference problems. Since the key
piece of information in the ecological inference process is how the grouping func-
tion G aggregates the variables, more specific context of how the key variables of
our interest, x and y are aggregated by G becomes vital information.
1.4 The Voter Transition model
In studying electoral dynamics, what is called the voter transition model par-
simoniously describes the change in party support across elections. The model
provides an important insight into the stability and volatility of elections over
time. At the same time, the model is versatile enough to be modified to fit the re-
searchers’ need. The model’s standard focus is on the partisan shift of the voters
over time, but it can be also employed to investigate the dynamics of turnout and
the correlates of it, or the straight-ticket voting patterns within elections. Such
various applications of the voter transition model approaches are provided with
8
examples in later chapters.
To be sure, applying the model on aggregate data raises typical ecological in-
ference problems. Exactly because of the secrecy principle of voting, it is only the
aggregate marginals that are known to the researcher, and the task is to learn about
the proportions of individual voter movement from one party to another across
elections—namely, the loyalty and defection rates of the voters that describe how
consistently the voters behave across time.
It turns out that the transition model comes with several inherent problems that
make the ecological inference process more difficult than usual. First of all, the
model usually comes with severe aggregation bias problems. As was described
earlier, aggregation problems generally arise when individuals with similar at-
tributes that are being studied are more likely to be grouped into same aggregate
units. For example, if loyal Democrats live closer to one another and the same
holds true for loyal Republican voters, aggregation bias is introduced.
Non-linearity is also a defining trait of the voter transition model. Character-
istic forces of electoral choice such as uniform swings and emergence of minor
parties typically complicate existing linear ecological inference strategies.
Accommodating multipartism is also another serious challenge when using the
voter transition model. Political studies on real-world party systems would usu-
ally require incorporating more than three parties into the analysis. The current
ecological inference literature has yet to overcome the problem of filling in the
two-by-two table, when there are more than two parties, largely because of the
fundamental limitations that come with the aggregate data. However, I argue we
can do better.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the voter transition model by itself is a
9
limited description of elections. The electoral movement of the voters from one
choice to another over time is an interesting and important matter in studying
political dynamics. However, while individual-level data would typically tease
out answers to who changes electoral support and why the movement occurs, these
questions are most challenging for ecological analysis on aggregate data. In a
later chapter, I develop an extension to the voter transition model that seeks to
overcome this challenge.
1.5 Outline of Chapters
1.5.1 Current Strategies
The following chapters investigate the ecological inference problem focusing
on the analysis of aggregate election data and the voter transition model.
In the second chapter, I analyze existing ecological inference techniques in the
context of the voter transition model and put them under test comparing the eco-
logical estimates against individual-level results. In a setting where two and only
two parties compete in two elections, which is the simplest possible voter tran-
sition setup, the chapter provides ground work for later extensions to the voter
transition model.
As it turns out, conventional linear approaches such as the Goodman regres-
sion (1959) and Gary King’s EI technique (1997) routinely fail, and I show that the
ecological inference strategies break down when facing challenges such as severe
aggregation problems and nonlinearity in the data.
Thomsen’s model (1987) is particularly attractive in the sense that it is based
upon a consistent micro-level model of voter preferences and their electoral choices.
Using data sets from South Korean elections and British parliamentary elections,
10
I show that the suggested technique produces successful ecological estimates that
conform closely to panel or survey results.
I also provide a new criterion to evaluate ecological estimators, namely, dis-
aggregation consistency, which requires ecological estimators to produce better
answers with finer-grained data. Both theory and empirical results suggest that
the Thomsen estimator is disaggregation-consistent, while linear ecological esti-
mators are not.
1.5.2 Extensions to Multiparty Systems
The third chapter examines the possibility of an extension to the ecological
voter transition model in multiparty systems. As mentioned, elections in most
democratic political regimes in the world will include competition among more
than two parties or candidates. Moreover, if the researcher decides to include ab-
stention as a separate political choice, it becomes the case that the simplest voter
transition model cannot describe the simplest two-party system that exists, for
example, in the US.
Political methodologist have yet to develop more reliable techniques to model
multipartism. Even with individual-level data, multinomial choice models are
complex and require serious computing power. A typical multinomial probit esti-
mation would usually require the estimation of the cross-choice covariance struc-
tures, with the necessary number of parameters to estimate rapidly increasing
with more choice categories. Whether and how individual level models on multi-
nomial choices can provide direct insight into the analysis of aggregate data is a
subject that calls for further investigation.
In the ecological inference literature, approximations by adjusting first-round
estimates remain to be the principal strategy in dealing with multiple choice prob-
11
lems. However, I show that some existing approximations, including Thomsen’s
method, are only moderately convincing, if serviceable.
In the chapter, I provide an application of the iterative proportional fitting
(IPF)—which is also known as “raking”—to the context of adjusting ecological
inference estimates. Essentially, IPF is a process that “rakes” the first-round eco-
logical estimates in iteration to conform to the given population marginal distribu-
tions in the two elections, with the least amount of total change in the first-round
estimates.
Theoretically, it makes sense to emphasize the information of population total
marginals, since the information is discarded or transformed when the first-round
ecological estimates are computed based upon merged categories. Empirically,
I provide results that show IPF outperforms other alternatives when applied to
multiparty voter transition problems. The evaluation of the method uses exam-
ples from South Korean elections and the Miami-Dade Florida ballot image data
from the 2000 election in the US.
Several additional attractive features of applying IPF in the multiparty context
should be highlighted. First of all, the IPF solution is a unique solution to the
problem, and it eliminates the arbitrary choice of “reference parties,” or which
parties to merge first to conduct a two-by-two estimation. Second, it is indepen-
dent of the ecological inference technique that produces the first-round estimates,
and can generally be incorporated into other ecological inference strategies.
1.5.3 The Covariate Model
In the fourth chapter, I discuss and develop an extension of the Thomsen model
to accommodate additional covariates into the voter transition model. It is an
attempt to equip the voter transition model with an analytical mechanism that will
12
enable the researcher to study the correlates of voter movements across parties.
In a way, the question that the voter transition model asks can be character-
ized to be descriptive and somewhat coarse, even though the correct answer to
the question is sufficiently hard to come across with aggregate data. The voter
transition model typically studies the relative size of the movement of the voters,
but it would usually be the case that the researcher will want to go a step further
and ask who switched parties and why the transition occurred.
To this end, the Thomsen model is reinterpreted as a method of moment ap-
proach, and the model is extended to include covariates—simple fractions of peo-
ple who belong to a certain demographic group, say, the proportion of workers,
in a district—which will help the researcher to look into i) separate levels of party
support in the demographic groups (different levels of support among workers
and non-workers), and ii) separate sets of transition rates in the demographic
groups (different loyalty and defection rates among workers and non-workers).
This will enable the researcher to approach the more detailed mechanism that lies
beneath the voter transitions: for example, it opens up a new way to study elec-
toral realignments.
The example provided at the end of the chapter is a detailed picture of how
South Korean voters responded to the democratic reform of the country in 1987.
To study the impact of the major political transformation of the country on the vot-
ers, I look into the change in the turnout pattern of South Korean voters employ-
ing the developed model. More specifically, I examine whether formerly alienated
voters started to come to the polling booth after the democratization; at the same
time, I examine whether there would be any sign of decrease in turnout among
formerly mobilized voters in post-democratization elections.
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The foregoing investigation is to test whether and to what degree voter efficacy
and mobilization played a role in subduing democratic demands of the electorate
in pre-democratization elections; and whether and to what degree such political
forces changed and shaped the electoral landscape in the post-democratization
period. Answers to these questions will have further implications for the civil so-
ciety thesis, which states that the ripening of civil societal groups was the main
factor in bringing about the democratization of South Korea, not unlike in other
new democracies that emerged and were labeled as the “Third Wave of Democ-
racy.” (Huntington 1991) Proponents of this thesis have had to rely only upon
qualitative analyses or anecdotal descriptions to answer substantively important
key questions. The chapter shows that ecological inference techniques can open
up the possibility of answering such questions with quantitative evidence.
CHAPTER II
Voter Transition Rates and Ecological Inference
2.1 Introduction
Ecological inference can be stated in a general econometric context as a problem
of statistical under-identification. The data obtained at the aggregate level are not
sufficient to determine the micro-level data generating process. In other words,
the inference requires the addition of strong assumptions or external information,
upon which the validity and accuracy of the estimators heavily rely.
Gathering individual level data, such as those from survey studies, would be
a more direct way to grapple with individual relationships: individual data re-
quire milder assumptions and can produce more desirable estimates. However,
as every ecological inference study claims, the cost or availability of such data
makes the employment of ecological inference often inevitable. For example, re-
searchers bearing historical questions of quantitative nature would more often
than not have to deal with aggregate data. Moreover, in most non-Western coun-
tries, researchers are faced by survey data problems that are more complicated
than their mere availability. Without the benefits of accumulated skills and expe-
rience of conducting survey studies, the sampling process could be dubious; how
the respondents in these countries react when asked to reveal their political pref-
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erences is not well understood. Compared to survey data, aggregate records such
as electoral outcomes or census studies are more accurate, extensive, and tabled
down to relatively small geographical units. This is true especially in centralized
bureaucratic governments. Thus, in a sense, ecological inference can be useful for
comparative political studies of the non-Western world, if only as a complement
to individual level studies.
Perhaps it is such promise that spurred the recent discussions and advances
in the field of ecological inference (for example, Achen and Shively 1995; King
1997, Rosen et al. 2000). However, the techniques are still far from satisfactory—
sometimes the suggested techniques work, sometimes they fail. And moreover,
“better” aggregate data sets, such as fine-grained data sets, do not always pro-
duce better answers. I focus on the voter transition model, a typical ecologi-
cal inference technique which nevertheless has failed at times. In the following
section, I briefly summarize the voter transition model and derive the answers
from generic approaches suggested by Goodman and King. I also provide empir-
ical examples where such approaches fail by comparing ecological estimates and
individual-level survey results. In Section 3, I discuss problems of aggregation
and non-linearity that are native to the voter transition model and argue that such
problems cause bias and inconsistency. Section 4 critically summarizes an alter-
native non-linear model originally suggested by Thomsen (1987), and interprets it
in terms of a simple voter utility model. I derive a generalized assumption of the
estimator that implies unbiasedness and consistency. Section 5 provides empirical
results. The last section briefly concludes.
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2.2 Voter Transition Rates and the Failure of Generic Ecological Estimators
2.2.1 The Baseline Model: Ecological Regression
Estimation of voter transition rates from aggregate data is a typical ecological
inference problem. The electoral support for n contending parties for two consec-
utive elections (marginal probability) is known for each observation unit, while
there is no information on the individual counts for all the possible n2 cells (that
is, the joint probabilities). The objective of the ecological inference here is to infer
the individual voting choice based on the aggregate information, that is, marginal
vote fractions.1
Suppose that we want to estimate the loyalty and defection rates of voters in
two consecutive elections where two and only two parties compete against each
other, with no option to abstain and no replacement of any voter. The loyalty and
defection rates can be defined as conditional probabilities of voting for a party,
say, Democratic, in the second election based on voters’ previous choices. For
example, suppose we have a random sample of the population of voters, with
their voting record for two consecutive elections. Then the following table can
be filled in with the conditional probabilities that a voter will either stay loyal or
defect from the party for which she voted in election 1.
Time 1 Vote
Democrat Republican
Time 2 Democrat p q
Vote Republican 1− p 1− q
Figure 2.1: Voter Transition Rates in Two Successive Elections
These rates render an individual-level interpretation as well: For voter i, (i =
1By “voter transition models,” I refer to a setup that exclusively deals with two, usually consecutive, sets of electoral
returns. Researchers sometimes use the term to refer to relationships between social variables, such as race, as independent
variables, and electoral returns as dependent variables, which is quite different questions from what I deal here, both
substantively and statistically. I make a distinction between the two, and show the former is a more difficult problem than
the later.
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1, 2, ..., N), let d2i = 1 if i voted Democratic, 0 if Republican in the second elec-
tion, and define d1i in the same fashion for the first election. Then the following
relationship holds for each i:
Prob(d2i = 1) = pid1i + qi(1− d1i) (2.1)
If one voted Democratic last time (d1i = 1), her probability to vote for the
Democrats this time is pi; while if one voted Republican last time (d1i = 0), her
probability to defect to the Democratic party is qi. The p and q in Figure 2.1 are
simply the mean of pi’s and qi’s and can be expressed as a linear regression at the
individual level.
d2i = pd1i + q(1− d1i) + ui = q + (p− q)d1i + ui (2.2)
where ui = (pi − p)d1i + (qi − q)(1− d1i)
Despite the dichotomous dependent and independent variables, the OLS esti-
mation will exactly produce the parameters in Figure 2.1 and the estimates will
have the usual desirable properties since E(ui) = 0 and Cov(d1i, ui) = 0. In other
words, with individual level data, we would be able to describe the exact loyalty
and defection rates of the voters.
However, all the information about votes in our data is aggregated and tabu-
lated by precinct, county, or other geographical units. For each unit j, let D1j and
D2j denote the fraction of aggregated individual votes for the two consecutive
elections shown in continuous forms. Since the relationship (2.2) will hold for any
geographical unit, we may average both sides of the equation for unit j with nj
voters and write:
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D2j = pjD1j + qj(1− D1j) (2.3)








Obviously the equation is not identified. Goodman (1953) suggests if we can
reasonably assume that the parameters pj’s and qj’s are constant across districts,
or at least mean independent of D1j, we may obtain an aggregate regression rela-
tionship
D2j = q + (p− q)D1j + Uj (2.4)
where Uj = qj − q + (pj − p− qj + q)D1j
which is a simple OLS setup. If the assumption holds, the OLS estimates will be
unbiased since E(Uj) = 0 and Cov(D1j, Uj) = 0. Standard errors for the estimated
probabilities can be obtained in an obvious way, although they may be subject to
heteroscedastic corrections.2
2.2.2 King’s Estimation Procedure for Ecological Inference
Among the attempts to improve Goodman’s method, King (1997) focuses on
the “out-of-bounds” problem in the Goodman estimators. The most important
insight of King’s setup is to take advantage of information that can be provided by
the method of bounds. To this end, he adopts a two-stage procedure, first deriving
a truncated bivariate normal distribution that underlies the local parameters and
then using the distribution to calculate local estimates, which he then combines
to create aggregate level estimates. King’s estimation process in the context of the
2As Achen and Shively (1995) point out, sampling errors are less significant than actual disturbance variances compared
to other sources of heteroscedasticity, such as incorrect assumptions. For example, since Goodman assumptions never hold
in practice, the disturbance variance introduced by varying parameters always overwhelms the sampling error.
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voter transition model can be described in more detail as follows: First, rearrange
Equation (2.3), the district accounting identity, into a relationship between pj and





1− D1j pj (2.5)
Second, on a [0, 1] × [0, 1] parameter space, draw the lines for all j’s. The pos-
sible ranges of pj and qj for each district exactly represent the possible ranges that
can be calculated by the method of bounds. Now, if the Goodman assumption of
constant parameters holds, all the lines should intersect at a single point, (p∗, q∗).
If the parameters vary randomly across districts around the true point, the line
segments will pass near the point. An example of such lines and their smoothed
density is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2.2: Parameter Bounds and Their Density
The lines in the left figure represent possible combinations of (pj, qj) for each
district. And as is true with any real-world aggregate data, they do not meet at one
point. King postulates, then, the density should tell us something about (pj, qj),
the distribution of the parameters. For example, in Figure 2, (pj, qj) should lie
somewhere around the lower-right corner with a high value of p and a low q.
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According to King, it can further be assumed that the probability density of
(pj, qj) follows a truncated bivariate normal distribution3 with correlation ρpq.
The five parameters of the distribution, i.e., the means ( p̄, q̄), variances (σ2p, σ2q ),


















q (1− D1j)2 + 2σ2pqD1j(1− D1j)
which corresponds to a GLS for the Goodman setup, except the truncation part
and the construction of the variance term4.
Next, simulate unit level parameters, pj’s and q’s for all j’s, from the derived
posterior distribution, conditional on equation (2.5). Retrieve their means, p̃j’s
and q̃j’s. Then, the weighted averages of the means represent King’s estimates for
the aggregate level quantities.
2.2.3 Empirical Examples
It has been reported that Goodman’s regression, especially when applied to
voter transition rate problems, tends to give logically impossible answers that are
above 100% or below 0% (Gosnell 1942; Achen and Shively 1997, Ch. 3), or, as
King (1997, p. 58) observes, outside of the bounds that can deterministically be
narrowed down by the data. Usually, the estimates are known to be far from
the “true” values when available, or from their corresponding survey estimates.
3A more recent version of this approach (King et al. 1999) assumes a more flexible beta distribution, but the basic concept
is the same.
4Constructing a convolution of binomial distributions results in a different specification of the variance. In a binomial
setup, the variance of the disturbance is σ2j =
[
D1j p(1− p) + (1− D1j)q(1− q)
]
/nj where nj denotes the number of total
votes in district j. Note that it is the regression residuals of D2j’s that are assumed to be normally distributed in Goodman’s
model, while King explicitly assumes the bivariate-normality of (pj, qj) and tries to derive the distribution.
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Worse, such ecological estimates usually come with near-perfect fits. In a word,
the linear regression model has continuously failed the test of voter transition
problems.
Contrary to its acclaimed success, however, neither does King’s estimator work
well with voter transition problems. Table 2.1 reproduces estimates of voter transi-
tion rates in 1964–1966 British Parliamentary elections which was originally used
by Stokes (1969) to show the failure of ecological regression. Additional to Achen
and Shively (1995, p. 125)’s re-estimation, I provide estimates from a constrained
regression5, and King’s EI estimator.
Parameter Panel Ecol. Reg. Const. Reg. EI
Tory-to-Tory (p) .87 .9488 .9036 .9047
(s.e.) (.022) (.0082) (.0038) (.0028)
Labour-to-Tory (q) .03 -.0255 .010 .0054
(s.e.) (.010) (.0058) — (.0020)
Aggregate Sample Size: N = 145
Table 2.1:
Voter Transition Estimates in British Parliamentary Elections 1964–1966, Straight-Fight
Seats.
Note: Data Source: Achen and Shively (1995)
As is common with ecological regressions, the estimator produces a logically
impossible estimate for the defection rate that is below zero. Also, the estimate
for the loyalty rate is more than three standard errors above the panel survey
estimate. Estimates from a constrained regression which sets the q parameter to
be at an arbitrary minimum of .01 is also reported. King’s EI estimator does not
fare any better than the constrained regression, although the estimated loyalty
rate is within the 95% confidence interval of the panel estimate.
Table 2.2 below is a parallel comparison of the estimators for the 1992–1997
presidential elections in South Korea, where the variables are the vote share of
5To estimate a constrained regression, I simply “fix” the out-of-bounds coefficients from the plain ecological regression
to either .01 or .99, and run a second round of regression on the residuals.
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Parameter survey Ecol. Reg. Const. Reg EI
DP-to-DP (p) .8676 1.0352 .9900 .9843
(s.e.) (.0117) (.0022) — (.0015)
Others-to-DP (q) .1984 .0641 .0777 .0858
(s.e.) (.0138) (.0015) (.0014) (.0008)
Aggregate Sample Size: N = 3380
Data Sources: Korean Social Science Data Center, National Survey of the Fifteenth Pres-
idential Election (1997); Korean National Election Commission, The Presidential Election,
http://www.nec.go.kr.
Table 2.2: Voter Transition Estimates in South Korean Presidential Elections, 1992–1997.
the Democratic Party—one of the major parties in Korea—in the two elections.
It should be noted that the unit of aggregate observation is township, with the
total N being over 3,300. As can be seen, the results show essentially a similar
pattern where the aggregate estimators fail to produce reliable estimates of voter
transition rates. With a larger sample size and smaller unit of observations, the
estimates are even worse than those from the British elections.
Strategies such as adding aggregate covariates into the model can certainly pro-
vide help (Hanushek et al., 1974). However, for the purpose of retrieving voter
transition rates, the process is more complicated than merely “controlling” for de-
mographic variables with individual data. Even assuming that the micro causal
relationship is perfectly accurate, we do not know exactly what the “controlled”
coefficients for voter transition rates exactly pick up from the aggregate data. In
an extreme case, loyalty rates can come close to zero when control variables and
combinations of them predict the dependent variable well. In other words, what
the voter transition model tries to estimate is not the accurate causal relationship,
but a quantity that just describes voters’ conditional probability to remain loyal or
defect from a given party. Thus, additional variables should be chosen in a way
that only reduces aggregation bias: ecological cross-sectional regression is unbi-
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ased only when the micro-level specification makes the correlation between geo-
graphical location and the parameters zero (Achen and Shively 1995, pp. 101–106).
This seems to be hopelessly hard, if not impossible, with aggregated demographic
information. Also, as a practical matter, not as many aggregate control variables
are readily available as their micro-counterparts, in addition to the fact that their
variances are usually very small compared to survey data sets. These problems
make dealing with the aggregation bias more difficult.
2.3 Aggregation Bias, Non-linearity and Disaggregation Consistency
2.3.1 The Direction of Aggregation Bias in VTR Setup
The pattern shown in the previous section is quite general in ecological voter
transition estimates. More specifically, when ecological regression is applied to
voter transition models, the estimates are biased: loyalty rates are too high and
defection rates are too low. The bias is introduced when voters with the same
attributes are grouped into the same aggregate units. Although it is not straight-
forward to derive the functional form of the aggregation bias, it is possible to
show the condition under which ecological regression estimates will be biased in
the typical directions.
First, rewrite Equation (2.2) as d2i = q + βd1i + ui. Further, suppose there exist
individual-level data with N observations, and represent the variables into vec-
tors, d1 and d2. Now, define a N × J indicator matrix G that “groups” N indi-
vidual observations into J groups. Then, for example, G′d1 is the data matrix
with sums of votes for each aggregate unit j (= 1, 2, ..., J). Then we may write the
aggregate variables as D1 = Ad1and D2 = Ad2 where we also define an “aggre-
gation matrix” A = (G′G)−1G′, which transforms individual votes into fractions
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of aggregated votes for each unit j.
Rewriting the variables in the individual relationship shown above into vectors
and pre-multiplying them by A yield
Ad2 = q + Ad1β + Au
which corresponds to the aggregate-level ecological regression relationship shown
before, D2j = q + βD1j + Uj.
The aggregate slope estimate, β̂, is biased when the regressor, D1j , is correlated
with the disturbance term. More specifically,






If the aggregation by A occurs independently of the vote choices, the ecological
estimates are unbiased. However, if the aggregation matrix disproportionately
sorts voters with regard to d1i and d2i, high values of D1j’s will be correlated with
positive errors (u = 1− p when d1 = 1 and d2 = 1) while low D1j’s will more
likely be related to negative errors (u = −q when d1 = 0 and d2 = 0).6 For
example, when repeating Democratic voters live closer to one another and the
same holds true for repeating Republican voters, aggregation bias is introduced.
Note that this is another way to say that the parameters vary and are correlated
with the regressor: high D1j’s are correlated with high loyalty rates and low D1j’s





1− p when d1i = 1 and d2i = 1
−p when d1i = 1 and d2i = 0
1− q when d1i = 0 and d2i = 1
−q when d1i = 0 and d2i = 0
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with low defection rates. Quite typically, such aggregate data will be dispersed
over a wide range on both the dependent and independent variables, and display
a clear correlation pattern. If this is the case, the aggregate slope estimate contains
a positive bias.
When the positive bias in the estimated slope exists, we may derive the direc-
tion of biases in the aggregate estimates assuming equal size of units, d̄1i = D̄1j
and d̄2i = D̄2j:
E(q̂)− q = (D̄2j − β̂D̄1j)− (d̄2i − βd̄1i) = (β− β̂)D̄1j < 0
E( p̂)− p = (β̂ + q̂)− (β + q) = (β̂− β) + (q̂− q) = (β̂− β)(1− D̄1j) > 0
which complies with the typical directions of bias in aggregate ecological regres-
sions applied to the voter transition model.
King’s estimator is faced by the same problem since it is based on the same
model. As King notes, the estimator does not directly deal with aggregation bias
(1997, pp. 159–161) per se, although it is claimed that the method is more robust to
such problems (King 1997, Chapter 11: “Robustness to Aggregation Bias”). Still,
from the empirical results in the previous section, we also notice that King’s esti-
mator shows a certain improvement, which is due to the built-in truncation pro-
cess.7 Somewhat generally, EI’s truncation affects the fit in the opposite direction
of the usual aggregation bias. Consider a bivariate-normal distribution of (pj, qj)
with a high mean p and a low mean q, which is the usual case in a voter transition
model setup. If this is true, pj would be more heavily truncated in large values
while qj would be more heavily truncated in small values resulting in
7Technically, there is no logical relationship between truncation and aggregation bias: truncation is meant to deal with
the problem where the estimates are out of their theoretical bounds.
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p < pLS and q > qLS .
Figure 2.3: An “Overcorrection” by King MLE
In other words, King’s truncation “corrects” the Goodman coefficients to the
opposite directions of their biases, although the truncation is not meant to deal
directly with aggregation problems. It works in a way that is quite similar to the
constrained regression that suppresses out-of-bound estimates. Then, it is logi-
cally possible that King’s estimates may be biased in the opposite directions of
ecological regression estimates. In Figure 3 shown above, the vote shares of the
Korean Democratic Party in one region—a subset of the observations used in the
estimation before—are plotted against each other. The fit is poor, especially con-
sidering the intercept which is q: with heavy truncation occurring at small values
of qj’s, it is “over-corrected” to the opposite direction of the bound.
To be exact, the normality assumption of the parameters does not hold. To
satisfy the bivariate normality assumption, the estimation procedure critically as-
sumes the unimodality of (pj, qj). In an extreme case which is shown below, where
votes from two opposing parties in consecutive elections are plotted against each
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other, a violation of the unimodality assumption, plus heavy truncations and a
flat likelihood function, the results are at best unstable. As can be seen from the
right sub-figure of Figure 2.4, a more reasonable modal point seems to be located
around the upper-left corner with a negative p and high q values, which would
have fit the data better. However, with a “wrong” starting value, the maximizing
sequence could stop at a local maximum, which is located at the lower right hand
side of the right figure as indicated. This would result in a disastrous fit that is
shown in the left figure. This ML estimation can be “re-corrected” at the simu-
lation stage, but still there is no guarantee that the final estimates yield reliable
results.
Figure 2.4: When Things Go Wrong
2.3.2 Non-Linearity Problems
Another obvious challenge for linear approaches is the fact that voter transi-
tion data usually display non-linearity when plotted, especially when the range
of variables is wide. To be sure, the non-linearity problem cannot clearly be sep-
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arated, at least observationally, from aggregation problems: it can be caused by
aggregation (correlated parameters), or just simply by variable scales. However,
the point here is that there are certain characteristic forces of electoral choices that
make the non-linearity problem more severe in VTR setups than in usual aggre-
gate data sets.
A uniform swing, a commonly observed feature of electoral systems, will usu-
ally create non-linearity in the data, since the variables are bound between zero
and one. Another common cause of non-linearity is multi-partism. In a “near-
two-party” system, where a minor party performs either better or worse in the
second election than it did in the first, we would usually observe a significant
change in the middle range, of which districts are not heavily loyal to either of the
major parties.8 In addition, minor parties may choose to field candidates mainly
in such districts which will create non-linearity.
Figure 2.5 below is a plot of vote returns for a presidential candidate from the
Grand National Party – another major South Korean party — which lost quite a
few supporters to a minor-party candidate. The shift of the voters around the
middle is quite obvious, making the non-linearity apparent, and as can be seen,
the superimposed nonlinear fit9 is better than the linear fit.
Such non-linearity problems are aggravated by the fact that variables of ag-
gregate party support typically display large variance over a wide range. Under
certain settings where the non-linearity problem is less severe, linear ecological es-
timators might be able to produce reliable answers, but the usage would have to
be justified before applying the technique by checking if the data and substantive
8Of course, an exact opposite effect is also possible in congressional elections due to strategic voting, since minor parties
are less likely to gain votes in competitive districts, which are clustered in the middle along the two axes. The point is that
VTR models are prone to systematic non-linearities.
9The curve represents a linear fit of the two probit-transformed variables, which is implied by the Thomsen model that


































Figure 2.5: Non-Linearity in VTR Models
knowledge all suggest that the assumptions of the techniques will hold.10 But if it
is true that non-linearity is apparent in the data (which is usually the case for VTR
models) with aforementioned problems, there is little reason to continue using
linear models for voter transition problems.11
2.3.3 Do “Better” Data Always Help?: Disaggregation Consistency
The problems described above also imply that better data, or fine-grained in-
formation, do not necessarily produce better answers for linear approaches. Gen-
erally, we may consider “lower-level” aggregate data with smaller or less popu-
lous units of observations better for the following reasons: first, the aggregation
problem may be less severe in smaller units, and second, more observations and
larger variance will guarantee better precision of the estimates. In the extreme
case where the the aggregate unit is a single person, we know that the aggrega-
tion bias will disappear, since there is no aggregation. Although different from
the notion of consistency in the usual econometrics context, we may call this de-
10Certain demographic variables, turnout rates, or even vote fraction within small geographic regions may qualify. How-
ever, note that such variables usually tend to have small variances with high inflation factors (Palmquist 1993).
11Achen and Shively (1995, pp. 133-142.) prove that adding a quadratic term always reduces the bias in Goodman
regression.
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sirable property of ecological estimators as “disaggregation consistency,” in the
sense that we expect better answers when we have “better” data, or finer-grained
data.
Precinct electoral returns make better data than county-, district-, or state-level
records: but will linear models produce better answers? The discussion in the pre-
vious sections leads us to believe that the conventional way of thinking aggregate
data does not always hold for linear VTR models.
First, note that the aggregation bias shown in Equation (2.7), Cov(Ad1, Au)Var(Ad1) will be
reduced in fine-grained data sets. More specifically, the denominator, the variance
of the independent variable, will increase as we go down the ladder of aggrega-
tion with smaller aggregate unit sizes.12 However, the numerator, the covariance
between the independent variable and the aggregate error term, will not increase
as fast as the denominator. Thus, the aggregation bias defined in such fashion will
be reduced in “better” data sets, although it will still be present.13
However, recall the fact that non-linearity in the data will become more appar-
ent when the variance and range of the variables increase. In other words, the
bias introduced by non-linearity may become greater for linear models in “bet-
ter” data sets. When the underlying true relationship is non-linear, test statistics
or diagnostic measures are meaningless. The estimates will be biased with smaller
standard errors; statistics such as Palmquist (1993)’s inflation factor14 may work
12Define two aggregation matrices AP(recint), and AD(istrict). It is straightforward to show that Var(APd) > Var(ADd),
since the observations will regress to the mean as the aggregate unit becomes larger.
13Proof:
Define the variables as VP = Var(APd), VD = Var(ADd), CP = Cov(APd, Au) and CD = Cov(ADd, Au). Then, from
above, VP > VD . Also, VP > CP, VD > CD , and CP > CD will generally be true. The question is the relative size of
aggregation biases in the two data sets.















the precinct level aggregation bias will generally be smaller than the district-level bias. Q.E.D.
14The inflation factor can be defined as the inverse of the between-versus-total variance ratio, and is the ratio of how
much the bias is inflated. Essentially, the measure suggests that data with smaller aggregate units will produce better
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to the opposite direction.
The observations above suggest the following: first, linear approaches to the
VTR model are prone to bias due to problems of aggregation and non-linearity.
Second, although it is hard to remedy the aggregation problem, ecological estima-
tors would benefit from modeling the linkage between individual and aggregate
relationship. Third, when non-linearity is apparent in the data, there is little rea-
son to continue using linear models. Especially, even when “better” data are avail-
able, linear models will not necessarily produce better answers, while non-linear
models may take advantage of them.
Non-linear approaches, of course, come with a price: identification is hard to
achieve, estimated parameters cannot be straightforwardly interpreted, and the
results may be unstable depending on the assumptions. Among the non-linear ap-
proaches, a method suggested by Thomsen (1987) has been successful in a number
of applications to various countries. The method is interesting in the sense that it
tries to directly model a nonlinear specification into the voter transition model at
the individual-level. The next section describes the model, examines its assump-
tions, and provides reasoning for the frequent success of the estimator.
2.4 Thomsen’s Nonlinear Model
2.4.1 Modeling Partisanship
Going back to the voter transition model, Thomsen argues the regression ap-
proach that treats two consecutive elections asymmetrically (that is, imposing a
causal relationship) is prone to problems such as misspecification or multicollinear-
ity. Instead, he suggests treating them symmetrically, the two election outcomes
being a result of a common latent factor (Thomsen 1987, pp. 46–45). Whether we
estimates.
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call this unobservable variable true partisanship or policy position, once we es-
tablish the relationship between this variable and observed election outcomes, we
would be able to model the relationship between the two elections.
Denote d∗i as a latent long-term partisanship or policy position that determines
i’s vote for two consecutive elections, d1i and d2i. Define Φ(·) as the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution15. At its simplest form,
we may write within unit j, i’s probability to vote Democratic is
Prob(dtij = 1) = Φ(αt + βtd∗ij + etj) (2.8)
by assuming the following: first, in a given election, voter i’s underlying parti-
sanship affects her probability to vote for a given party, probit-linearly. The linear
term — the inverse of the equation — can be interpreted as the utility difference
from voting for a given party instead of the alternative: if the utility is larger than
zero, one would vote for party D, otherwise, one would vote for another. Fac-
tors not correlated to partisanship are assumed to be random in their effects on
votes, which is the simplest possible setup and at the same time a fair approxima-
tion. Second, the coefficients for the partisanship factor, αt’s and βt’s, are different
for each election, although they are assumed constant across voters and thus dis-
tricts. Equation (2.8) implies that the inverse-probit transformed probabilities, or
the utilities to vote for a given party in the two elections, are linearly related to
each other.
The aggregate outcome Dtj we observe from a given district j, should corre-
spond to the expected vote fractions in the district using equation (2.8). Assum-
15In actual estimation, Thomsen’s ECOL implements logit specification and inversed tetrachoric correlation, which re-
sults in slightly different estimates from the steps shown in this chapter. A probit specification along with a direct integra-
tion is used for a more intuitive interpretation, and a corresponding algorithm is written and used for this chapter. Stata
and Matlab routines that produced the results are available from http://www.umich.edu/~wpark/progs.
33
ing with Thomsen that the underlying dimension d∗ij is normally distributed with
mean D∗j and a constant variance σ
2, find the average of both sides of equation
(2.8):
E(dtij) = Dtj =
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(αt + βtd∗ij + etij)φ(d
∗
ij|D∗j , σ2)∂d∗ij (2.9)
By carrying out the integral, we obtain (Achen and Shively 1995, p. 184.):
E(dtij) = Dtj = Φ

 αt + βtD
∗
j√
1 + β2t σ2

 (2.10)
Since we established that the inverse-probit of D1j and D2j are normally dis-
tributed and linearly related to each other, they are bivariate normally distributed,
with correlation ρagg. For identification, Thomsen substitutes this aggregate cor-
relation for its individual counter-part: the correlation between the individual
utilities to vote for a given party in two elections as seen in equation (2.8).16 This
does not identify all the parameters but is sufficient to estimate the voter transi-
tion rates. Recall that what the voter transition model is intended for is not αt’s
and βt’s that concern the relationship between the unobservable variable and elec-
toral outcome, but to infer the transition rates between the two electoral returns,
D1j and D2j.









, are bivariate normally distributed with known means—that
is, the probit transformed national fraction of the party—and an estimated cor-
relation, a double integration of the bivariate-normal function would yield the
joint probability to vote for a given party two consecutive times. More specifi-
cally, denote x1 and x2 as random variables for the probit transformed values of
16This identification condition is discussed later in more detail.
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vote fractions of each district, r as their correlation, and µ1 and µ2 as the probit-






φ(µ1, µ2; r)dx2dx1 (2.11)
would yield the estimated fraction of the voters in the entire electorate. So, di-
viding this quantity with the marginal proportion of voters from the first election
would yield the estimate for the loyalty rate. The defection rate can be derived in
a similar fashion, where the fraction of the voters who voted non-Democratic in






φ(µ1, µ2; r)dx2dx1 (2.12)
2.4.2 Bias in the Aggregate Correlation
Thomsen’s estimator achieves identification by equating individual (utility)
correlation with aggregate (transformed vote fractions) correlation. To see when
this postulate works, let us formulate the implied correlations at individual and
aggregate levels and derive the bias.
First, decompose the variance structure of individual utilities. There can be two
sources of variances: the dimensional and the non-dimensional that pertain to the
latent partisanship dimension. For the entire population, the variation occurs both
within and across the observed units, while the aggregate data would only reveal
the across-unit variances in ecological data. Thus, the total individual variance
can be decomposed into:
The individual correlation would include all four of the variances, while the
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ecological estimation of the correlation would only involve the across-unit vari-
ances, the second column. To find the individual correlation, invert equation (2.8),
and define the left-hand-side variable as voter i’s utility (difference) to vote for a
given party over the other party. Denote d∗ij as the underlying individual parti-
sanship for i, D∗j as its mean, uij as d
∗
ij’s deviation from D
∗






= αt + βtd∗j + etij
where Var(d∗ij) = Var(D
∗
j + uij) = 0 + σ
2 and Var(etij) = 1














For the entire nation, variances include the second column, the across-unit vari-
ances:
Utij = αt + βtd∗j + ξtij
where Var(d∗ij) = Var(D
∗
j + uij) = ω
2 + σ2 and Var(ξtij) = τ2t + 1













β1(ω2 + σ2) + (τ21 + 1)
√




However, (2.14) cannot be computed directly since we do not observe individ-
ual utilities. Thus, we have to estimate it using the ecological observations. To

















1 + β2t σ2
and ε′tj =
εtj√
1 + β2t σ2
with across-unit variances only: Var(D∗j ) = ω
2 and Var(εtij) = τ2t .











































Now the task is to find under what conditions (2.15) approximates (2.14). By
assuming τ1 = τ2, the difference between the squared aggregate and individual
correlation can be factored as













Equation (2.16) implies that the aggregate correlation equals the individual
correlation when the ratios of the variances shown in Figure 2.6 are constant —
σ2 : ω2 = 1 : τ2. In other words, if the proportion of the aggregate variance to
total variance is the same in both systematic and non-systematic variances, the
ecological correlation is an unbiased estimate of the individual correlation, and








A couple of substantive interpretations are implied by the identification con-
dition. First, without spatial heterogeneity, the ecological correlation is unbiased.
This is equivalent to Thomsen’s original “homogeneous district assumption” that
districts are (almost) perfectly similar dimensionally. When there are no cross-
district variances, τ2t = ω
2 = 0, and the condition above is trivially satisfied.
Moreover, in such cases, the expression G in (2.16) becomes zero, eliminating the
bias. However, the assumption is still troublesome in the sense that it assumes
away any cross-unit variances, which is, in fact, assuming away of the aggregation
problem. In this case, equation (2.15) can take any value between zero and 1 based
on the sampling error. The only possible implication of Thomsen’s district homo-
geneity assumption is that the total individual correlation (2.15) is equivalent to
estimating a within-district correlation (2.13), the entire nation being one large
district. Then, for (2.15) to approximate this quantity, our observations should
be something like a randomly sampled individual probability to vote for a party,
rather then the expectation of it in each district.
Second, with spatial heterogeneity, the aggregation bias of the ecological corre-
lation can be reduced by fine-grained data. Note that the quantities in (2.17) will
increase and get closer to unity as the between-unit variances increase and the
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within-unit variances decrease. Instead of assuming away the aggregation prob-
lem, we may allow that voters of similar preferences are more likely to live in the
same unit, which is a more realistic assumption, especially in the case of a voter
transition setup. In such cases, the smaller the unit size is, ω2 and τ2t will become
larger relative to their counter parts, making the quantities in (2.17) closer to unity,
and satisfying the identification condition. Additionally, a smaller aggregate unit
size will more likely satisfy the constant within-unit variance assumption. In other
words, the estimator is disaggregation-consistent.
2.5 Empirical Results
British Parliamentary Elections 1964–1966
Table 2.3 reproduces Table 2.1 that was shown before, with the Thomsen es-
timates added to them. As can be seen, the Thomsen estimates are significantly
closer to the survey estimates than any other estimates, both the loyalty and de-
fection parameters well within the survey sampling error. Still, we cannot quite
decisively say the performance is better than other estimators since the 95% con-
fidence interval of the survey estimates includes some other estimates as well.
Moreover, it is subject to questions whether the constant variance assumption of
Thomsen’s estimator is satisfied in the England data—which means that Scottish
voters are assumed to have a similar preference structure to London voters. One
possible way to solve the problem is to partition the data set into provinces or re-
gions, where presumably, the voters can be seen as more homogeneous. However,
because of the limited number of observations, the strategy is not feasible here.
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Parameter Survey Ecol. Reg. Const. Reg. EI Thomsen
Tory-to-Tory (p) .87 .9488 .9036 .9047 .8861
(s.e.) (.022) (.0082) (.0038) (.0028) (.0084)
Labour-to-Tory (q) .03 -.0255 .010 .0054 .0185
(s.e.) (.010) (.0058) — (.0020) (.0059)
Aggregate Sample Size: N = 145
Table 2.3: Voter Transition Estimates in British Parliamentary Elections 1964–1966, Straight-Fight
Seats.
South Korean Presidential Elections 1992–1997
Table 2.4 reports the results from the Korean election data, but this time par-
titioning the dataset into eight regional areas to satisfy the constant variance as-
sumption17 of the Thomsen estimator. The figures report the average of regional
estimates weighted by their respective population size. The pattern is essentially
the same: large estimated loyalty rates and small defection rates from all the es-
timators. However, the Thomsen estimates outperform other estimators by a siz-
able margin. All the other estimates are missing the survey estimates by at least
10%, which is large inaccuracy considering the standard errors. The estimated de-
fection rate of the Thomsen estimator is somewhat off the target, but a significant
improvement from the other estimators.
Parameter Survey Ecol. Reg. Const. Reg. EI Thomsen
DP-to-DP (p) .8676 .9651 .9648 .9608 .8788
(s.e.) (.0117) (.0111) (.0103) (.0127) (.0126)
Others-to-DP (q) .1984 .0984 .0986 .0992 .1328
(s.e.) (.0138) (.0061) (.0058) (.0055) (.0071)
Aggregate Sample Size: N = 3380
Table 2.4: Voter Transition Estimates in South Korean Presidential Elections, 1992–1997
It still requires caution to state that the assumptions for the Thomsen estimator
are satisfied in the estimation. The assumptions for the estimator to work mostly
concern the variance structure of the voter preference, and are extremely hard
17Predictably, the Thomsen estimates using the non-partitioned dataset did not fare well with estimates, p = .95 and
q = .09.
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to verify. More specifically, because the assumptions pertain to individual-level
properties (which we do not observe in ecological data) and as well as to some-
thing that measures the latent utility of supporting a party, checking the validity
of these assumptions will not be an easy task. Perhaps external information such
as survey studies or prior knowledge, could be put to the task. However, see-
ing that the estimator gives reliable results in the table above, certain hypothetical
explanations can be provided.
First, the constant within-unit dimensional variance (σ2) assumption does not
hold without partitioning the dataset in the Korean case. Arguably, the partisan
variance in a small rural township or district is far smaller than in any of the
Seoul districts. Within a region, σ2j ’s would become relatively similar to each other,
at least more similar than those from out-of-region districts, making the data fit
Thomsen’s assumption. Also, this assumption is more likely to be satisfied when
the unit of analysis is smaller. The results support this explanation.
Second, although the Korean case does not meet Thomsen’s district homogene-
ity assumption, it might satisfy a weaker, or a generalized version of it, that was
provided in the previous section. More specifically, the model can be identified
when the cross-district variances overwhelm the within-district variances, which
does fit the profiles of Korean voters who can be characterized as homogeneous
within their “neighborhoods” and more heterogeneous across the borders.
South Korean Presidential Elections 1992–1997: Disaggregation Consistency
Now I provide comparable results using data sets from different levels of ag-
gregation to examine whether the performance of ecological estimators change
when “better” and “worse” data sets are used alternatively. Additional to the
township-level data set that was used for the estimations shown above, I use
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a more disaggregated data set recorded at the precinct-level and a more aggre-
gated district-level data set. The number of observations for each level of aggre-
gation can be found in the last row of Table 2.5 below. For example, since the total
number of valid votes was roughly around twenty million, each precinct includes
roughly two thousand voters.
Survey Ecological Regression EI Thomsen
Prcnt Tnshp Dist Prcnt Tnshp Dist Prcnt Tnshp Dist
p .8676 .9454 .9651 .9840 .9812 .9608 .9813 .8609 .8788 .9384
(s.e.) (.0117) (.0081) (.0111) (.0363) (.0071) (.0127) (.0280) (.0094) (.0126) (.0343)
q .1984 .1209 .0984 .1009 .1174 .0992 .1041 .1777 .1328 .1125
(s.e.) (.0138) (.0041) (.0061) (.0239) (.0036) (.0055) (.0145) (.0048) (.0071) (.0178)
N 840 12,016 3,380 302 12,016 3,380 302 12,005 3,380 302
Table 2.5: Comparison of Ecological Estimates at Different Levels of Aggregation, South Korean
Presidential Elections, 1992–1997
As is expected, it is only the Thomsen estimates that improve when applied
to increasingly less aggregated data sets. Both estimated parameters, especially
the estimated defection rate, improve significantly moving from district-level to
precinct level. The estimator is disaggregation-consistent in the sense that it is
taking advantage of the additional information in less aggregated data sets. Other
estimators do not show such disaggregation consistency. Aside from the fact that
the estimates are significantly biased across the board, not all the estimates im-
prove while moving from higher- to lower-levels of aggregation. For example,
the loyalty rate estimated by EI from the precinct-level data is more biased than
that from the township data, with the usual decrease in the standard error.
2.6 Conclusion
The ecological inference problem is in a sense a problem with deficient data.
Using external information and/or reliable assumptions, one would have to model
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the data generating process that underlies what we actually observe. Cross-level
inference is only possible when such cross-level assumptions are correct. The dif-
ficulty with ecological problems, then, is to formulate reasonable and justifiable
assumptions. The task of ecological inference should focus more on careful exam-
ination and substantive rumination of the model and the data.
Although the structure of the voter transition model is similar to other ecologi-
cal inference models, problem-specific difficulties such as severe aggregation bias
and systematic non-linearity make it hard for linear ecological inference strate-
gies to produce reliable estimates. Meanwhile, a more specialized approach, the
Thomsen estimator, which is based on micro-modeling of voter utility and party
choice, produces more accurate and consistent estimates.
Perhaps comparing the Thomsen estimator with other ecological estimators in
the first place might not be fair, since it is specifically designed to estimate voter
transition rates, while the ecological regression and the King model are designed
for more generic or sociological problems. For example, race or gender is just
observed, not governed by any underlying dimension: thus, the Thomsen model
cannot directly be applied to problems with such variables without substantial
modification. However, the success of the Thomsen model in this chapter stresses
the point that there is no general solution to the ecological inference problem but
only data- and problem-specific solutions.
Although ecological inference is prone to a number of problems, it can be
“solved” by constructing reasonable micro-relationships and assumptions about
the data. When such assumptions plausibly represent the real data-generating
process, ecological estimators would produce reliable answers. The Thomsen es-
timator shows a good example where such agreement between theory and reality
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results in a successful ecological inference process.
From a substantive point of view, the voter transition model I have discussed so
far is perhaps the simplest possible way to look at the movement of voters across
two elections. To deal with more complex and sophisticated research questions,
an apparent next step is to extend the simple ecological inference strategies to
represent more realistic and substantively interesting relationships. The following
chapters take up several of these tasks.
CHAPTER III
Ecological Inference in Multiparty Systems
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed the overall setup of the voter transition
model and how it can be approached from the viewpoint of aggregate data anal-
ysis. I demonstrated that traditional ecological inference techniques have usu-
ally failed while a model implied by Thomsen (1987) recovers the quantity of
interest—the voter transition rates—reasonably well from aggregate data. Nev-
ertheless, the model developed so far is restrictive in the following senses: first,
it will not allow the researcher to study elections with more than two parties or
candidates—or equivalently, force the researcher to simplify the electoral contest
into two opposing parties; second, the model does not allow the researcher to
incorporate information of the covariates into the model.
This chapter takes up the question on how to extend the ecological inference
techniques to estimate voter transition rates in multiparty systems. First, I will
define the problem at hand, and look into the existing techniques for multinomial
category problems. I will also highlight some of the difficulties of suggested tech-
niques and provide a set of possible solutions that can be implemented in practice.
More specifically, I focus on the interative proportional fitting (IPF) process to ad-
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just crude initial estimates using the information from aggregate marginals.
Second, the IPF process is then examined closely in a bootstrap simulation us-
ing ballot image data from the 2000 US presidential election. Most importantly,
I compare the mean squared errors of the IPF estimates against Thomsen’s mul-
tiparty extension. The simulation will provide a good opportunity to examine a
complex computation involving the IPF adjustment.
Finally, I will empirically test the suggested techniques applying them to esti-
mating the voter transition in South Korean presidential elections between 1992
and 1997. It will provide a useful foundation to test and examine different classes
of ecological estimators in a multiparty setup.
3.2 Voter Transition Rates in Multiparty Systems: Current Methods
An immediate problem with the simple bivariate model in the voter transition
context is that there usually are more than two parties. Many electoral systems
in the world consist of multiple parties, and even two-party systems will pose a
problem if we count non-voters (“party of abstainers”) as a separate category. The
usual practice has been either to drop non-significant categories, or collapse sim-
ilar parties into bivariate categories, effectively reducing the task into estimating
a 2× 2 table that was shown in the previous chapter. But more often than not,
researchers are forced to model the multidimensional relationship into the model.
In this section, I critically review existing methods that extend ecological inference
techniques into the multivariate context.
As it turns out, the Goodman ecological regression has a natural multivariate
extension. One would just write a system of equations with all the possible time-2
party shares explained by all the time-1 party supports as independent variables.
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Each equation can be estimated separately or estimated by seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) to gain full efficiency. For example, Zellner (1962) proposed a
general form of an estimator for multivariate regression equations based on a fea-
sible generalized least square technique. In any case, within the context of the
voter transition setup, SUR coefficient estimates are the same as those from linear
regression—that is, the Goodman estimates—in expectation, and the model only
corrects the standard errors. For an SUR approach to explain multiparty election
result with non-electoral covariates, see Jackson (2002).
For the particular purpose of retrieving individual-level parameter from aggre-
gate data in the voter transition setup, there is no reason to believe a multivariate
approach will come through where bivariate estimation falls short. Most impor-
tantly, the usual aggregation bias will remain a problem, and at the same time
nonlinear relationships involving small parties will present serious challenges to
the linear specification. More likely than not, the estimation will still yield out-of-
bounds estimates on certain sets of coefficients, as will be demonstrated in a later
section.
3.2.1 Multivariate Extension of the Constrained Regression
In a way, the constrained regression technique provides some insight into the
matter on how to cope with the out-of-bounds estimates from a Goodman setup
in a multiparty context. A constrained regression would be an estimation pro-
cess where one would “fix” the first-round estimates that are greater than 1 or
smaller than zero. In a bivariate relationship, the estimation is straightforward:
one would just set the out-of-bounds coefficient to a fixed value (say, the loyalty
rate to .99 if it initially exceeds unity) and estimate the remaining coefficient (say,
the defection rate). However, how to implement this in a multiparty context is not
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obvious, since fixing one coefficient in one equation will have an impact on all the
coefficients in the entire system of equations. Here I propose a simple solution to
the problem.
I shall start with a simple bivariate setup and provide the extension to a multi-
party case. Suppose a simple two party case where we estimate
D2j = pD1j + qR1j (3.1)
R2j = (1− p)D1j + (1− q)R1j (3.2)
The second equation is implied by the first, so in practice, the second equation
is not estimated separately. Now suppose that the least square estimate of p is
larger than unity. Since the estimate exceeds the logically possible value of 1, we
may choose to constrain the estimate to be under 1. If we fix the coefficient to be an
arbitrarily large value of .99, this will have an impact on the remaining coefficient.
The new constrained coefficient can be retrieved by generating a new variable
D2j − .99D1j and regress it on R1j without the constant term, that is
D2j − .99D1j = q′R1j + Uj (3.3)
where Uj = (p− .99)D1j + (q− q′)R1j. Following the Goodman assumption from
Chapter 2 that the parameters and regressor are not correlated, Cov(R1j, Uj) = 0,
then q′ is an unbiased estimator of the constrained defection rate. The resulting
pair, [p, q] = [.99, q′] would be the constrained regression estimates.
The key point here is how to work with the second equation to adjust to the im-
pact of the constraint. Adding the residuals Uj to the second equation guarantees
the coefficients add up to 1 since
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R2j + Uj = (1− p)D1j + (1− q)R1j +
[
(p− .99)D1j + (q− q′)R1j
]
= (1− .99)D1j + (1− q′)R1j (3.4)
This is equivalent to transferring the impact of the constraint to the other equation
and adjusting the unconstrained estimates.
In a bivariate setup, such adjustment is trivial in the sense that equation (3.3)
is implied by (3.4). However, in a multiparty case, the approach above can be
useful. Consider a case where three parties compete against one another in two
consecutive elections. The simple Goodman setup would be
D2j = pDDD1j + pRDR1j + pSDS1j
R2j = pDRD1j + pRRR1j + pSRS1j
S2j = pDSD1j + pRSR1j + pSSS1j
Now suppose the least squares estimate of pDD is larger than 1 and we want
to constrain it to be 99%. We would generate a new dependent variable D′2j =
D2j − .99R1j and regress it on R1j and S1j without a constant term:
(D2 − .99D1) = p′RDR1j + p′SDS1j + Uj
where
Uj = (pDD − .99)D1j + (pRD − p′RD)R1j + (pSD − p′SD)S1j
Dividing the residuals generated from the first equation and adding them to
the remaining two equations guarantees the coefficients to add up to unity. Any
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where r is a fraction, and adding them up to the remaining dependent variables,
will work for the purpose. Then the essential question is to determine the ratio r.
A theoretically consistent value of r should be the ratio of cross-equation cor-
relations. In a two party system, R2j = (1− D1j), thus, with the correlation being
minus one, r = (−1)/(−1) = 1. In the example of three party system shown




where ρ indicates the cross-equation correlations between the dependent vari-
ables. This will make the new dependent variables in the second round as R2j −
ρD,R
|ρD,R+ρD,S|Uj and S2j −
ρD,S
|ρD,R+ρD,S|Uj respectively.
This will also guarantee the coefficients from the new round of estimation add
up to unity. In other words, the effect of fixing a coefficient in one equation is
transferred to the remaining equations proportional to their correlation to the
fixed equation. It still is an ad hoc fix, since when the two correlations take dif-
ferent signs and their absolute values are similar, the denominator for r could
become arbitrarily small.
Alternatively, using covariances instead of correlations could be a reasonable
alternative, where r in fact corresponds to (the negative of) regression coefficients
between dependent variables. For example,
r =










Extensions to electoral systems with more than three parties are straightfor-
ward. This formula is used in the next section to retrieve results using constrained
regressions and is compared with other ecological estimators.
3.2.2 The King Estimator in A Multiparty Setup: Imputation
Extending King’s method to a multiparty setup is not simple. Generally, when
there are k parties in the first election and l in the second, the number of parame-
ters to estimate is k(l− 1). Thus, in a two-party system, the number of parameters
is just 2 (p and q), as in the running example, while in a three-party system, the
number of parameters increases to 6. While Goodman’s regression can simply be
extended by adding independent variables on more rounds of equations, King’s
method does not allow a direct estimation on such setups. However, he provides
an algorithm that computes a 3 by 2 table, where a third party has newly emerged
in the second election. Conceptually, since the marginal of a 2 by 2 sub-table ex-
cluding the third party is not known, this involves an imputation process.






S2j 1− pDD − pDR 1− pRD − pRR
Figure 3.1: Coefficients in a Three Party System: King’s Approach
Collapse the two major parties (M) versus the “small (S)” party and write
M2j = pDMD1j + pRMR1j (3.5)
Obviously, pDM = pDD + pDR and pRM = pRD + pRR. They can be estimated by
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constructing the new variable and applying the bivariate method to the observa-
tions. Now in the next step, estimate the four coefficients for the major parties in
the upper side of the figure above. To do so, since we do not know the marginals














where D̂1j and R̂1j are estimated quantities from p̂DMD1j and p̂RMR1j, respec-
tively.1
Conceptually, this is equivalent to a round of estimation after deflating the in-
dependent variables by pDM and pRM respectively. In other words, the cross-
equation correlations are ignored. An additional assumption is necessary to jus-
tify the independence between multiple choices, which will hold only when S2j
is equally correlated with D2j and R2j. Moreover, this imputation method cannot
be extended to the independent variables when the number of parties in the first
election is larger than 2.
As King suggests, along with Thomsen, such an extension would require mul-
tiple rounds of estimation of binary choices. Just to sketch the method, suppose a
2 by 3 table where a third party was included in the first election, and disappeared
in the second; label the party S, along with the usual notation for major parties D
and R. Our task is to estimate the conditional probabilities from the following
equations:
D2j = pDDD1j + qSDS1j + qRDR1j
R2j = (1− pDD)D1j + (1− qSD)S1j + (1− qRD)R1j
(3.7)
1Note that in King’s notation (1997, p. 69, Equation 4.5.), the first-round variable (M2j) is included in the denomina-
tor because his objective is to compute the conditional fraction (p|M2), which is different from the objective of the voter
transition model.
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The second equation is implied by the first, so estimating the first equation is
enough as has been the case for 2 by 2 setup. First, collapse any two fractions from
three parties and estimate the parameters. For example, choose to form a “liberal”
block excluding party R, say, the Republican Party; call it L1j and estimate
D2j = pLDL1j + qRDR1j (3.8)
Now choose another possible combination to form a “conservative” block, C1j=
R1j+S1j, then another round of estimation would be
D2j = pDDD1j + qCDC1j (3.9)
Since we have “fine estimates” of qRD and pDD from Equations (3.8) and (3.9),
the only parameter left for estimation, qSD, can be determined by substituting the








As King admits, this procedure is not without problems. The results depend
on the decision and sequence of combining the parties: for example, we can start
by combining the major two parties excluding party S, and can come up with an
estimate of q̃SD which may be different from ˜̃qSD in Equation (3.10). As can be
seen later, sometimes Equation (3.10) can yield negative values. In fact, this en-
tire procedure is based on the assumption that the fractions of the three parties
are uncorrelated with each other, which is a stronger assumption than is used in
Equation (3.6). More recently, King provides a more sophisticated method with
multinomial choices (Rosen et al. 2001) which implements Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods on an assumed Dirichlet distribution: however, it still re-
mains to be seen how robust and effective the method is against the voter transi-
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tion setup in multiparty systems which necessarily will involve heavy truncation
of possible distributions of parameters.
3.2.3 The Thomsen Estimator in Multiparty Setup
The multiparty extension of the Thomsen estimator is not straightforward, al-
though he provides a reasonable algorithm that can be generalized to deal with an
arbitrarily large number of parties (Thomsen 1987). Suppose we observe electoral
support for the parties in time 1 (X1, . . ., XM) and time 2 (Y1, . . ., YM). Along with
Thomsen, let us define the joint proportion of voters that voted for party k at time
1 and party l at time 2 as pkl, where k = 1, ..., M and l = 1, ..., N. Note that the
proportion parameters are fractions of the entire electorate, not the (conditional)
loyalty rates. The goal is to fill in the table of coefficients shown in Figure 3.2.
Election 1
X1 X2 · · · Xk · · · XM
Election 2 Y1 p11 p21 · · · pk1 · · · pM1
















YN p1N p2N · · · pkN · · · pMN
Figure 3.2: Coefficients in a Multiparty System: Thomsen’s Approach
First, choose a “reference party” whose fraction of votes is not correlated or at
least equally correlated to those of other parties. Thomsen (1987, p. 74) reports
that choosing a neutral “party,” such as an “abstention” category, often yields
better estimation. From Figure 3.2, let Party M and N be the reference parties
at time 1 and time 2 respectively. Second, choose a pair of parties against the
54









Using this correlation, compute p̂kl,j, p̂kN,j, p̂Ml,j, and p̂ML,j for each district using
the inverse of Yule’s tetrachoric correlation. This will enable one to impute X̂l j
and Ŷkj. Third, using these as “data,” estimate the parameters, p̂kl, p̂kN , p̂Ml, and
p̂ML. Fourth, compute the marginals with ˆ̂Yl = ∑k p̂kland
ˆ̂Xk = ∑l p̂kl. Note that
these estimated marginals will not necessarily equal the observed variables, and




and ˆ̂pMl = p̂Ml
Yk
ˆ̂Yk
and similarly for other coefficients. Go back to step three and iterate until the
coefficients add up to unity, column by column.
Essentially, this iteration process tries to rescale the estimated coefficients by
the amount of the “error” made in the initial binary estimation stage. As will
be shown in the next section, this strategy produces reasonable estimates with
real data. However, the results are sensitive to the choice of the “reference party”
which will necessarily involve an arbitrary decision of the researcher. An ideal
reference party would have vote proportions that are not related or are equally
related to other choices: moreover, to guarantee stable results, the reference party
would have to be sizable compared to other choices. In this vein, a category of
“no voting” seems like a better candidate for the reference party—Thomsen’s own
suggestion. But this is not always the case. Sometimes, information on non-voters
is simply not available; or sometimes, non-voting is strongly associated with cer-
tain political blocs, making it no better than using other parties as the reference
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category.
To summarize, existing methods on adjusting multivariate coefficients have
their own flaws. In the next section, I suggest a new alternative method of iterative
proportional fitting and investigate its properties.
3.3 Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF)
It should be noted that all the general strategies reviewed in the previous sec-
tion are structured in two separate steps. First, split the categories into binary
combinations and retrieve the ecological estimates; second, adjust the coefficients
to match the known marginal proportions later. In fact, it is possible to think sep-
arately about the bivariate estimators and their multivariate extensions.
In this section, I propose an alternative way to combine such collections of
bivariate ecological estimates into a multivariate context using the iterative pro-
portional fitting (IPF) procedure. IPF has been used in many fields. But most
importantly, it has been used to generate disaggregated spatial information from
aggregated data in census studies. It is a mathematical scaling procedure to ad-
just a matrix of any dimension to converge to some pre-defined row and column
totals, where the the constraining row and column totals are obtained from al-
ternative sources. In a way, it acts as a weighting system whereby the original
table values are gradually adjusted through repeated calculations to fit the row
and column constraints.
Deming and Stephan (1940) first suggested using IPF in the context of adjust-
ing sample cell proportions of a contingency table to external constraints given as
marginal proportions. They argued that the technique, as often referred as “rak-
ing” estimates, can be used as a smoothing algorithm to adjust the cell frequencies
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or proportions from survey estimates to conform to the marginal distribution of
the same variables available from a census.
Even though IPF has never been used in the ecological inference literature, the
theoretical underpinnings of IPF blend well with the objective of this section. The
task here is to implement IPF into the process of adjusting estimated bivariate
coefficients to obey the constraints, which are the aggregate marginal proportions.
A description on how to implement IPF follows.
Following the running example of the multiparty voter transition problem,
suppose we have crude estimates of entries in a two-by-two classification of elec-
toral choices, X and Y, and call them pkl. From Figure 3.2, suppose we retrieved
the bivariate binary estimates by focusing upon one party against the rest of the
parties. More specifically, we may ignore the estimated defection rates, that is, the
transition from party i to other parties (∼ i), and just retrieve the loyalty rates. The
first-round estimate can be written as
p̂kl = G(Yl j, Xkj)
where the function G indicates the ecological estimation process from aggregate
data. For each permutation of time 1 and time 2 parties, this will yield a M× N
matrix with first estimates, P = { p̂kl}.
Let πkl denote the true probability that X = Xk and Y = Yl in the population
of interest, and let πk+ and π+l denote the known marginal probabilities. The
problem of interest is to find estimates, π̂kl, of πkl by adjusting the proportions of
P to the known marginal probabilities so that
∑
k





Deming and Stephan (1940) proposed the following algorithm to retrieve the






be the estimates of {πkl} at the tth iteration, and initially let π(0)kl = pkl
for all k and l. The algorithm proceeds by row and column adjustments, such as




















if t is even
where “+” denotes summation over the corresponding subscript. Repeat this un-
til the difference between the adjusted marginals and true marginals diminish
under a reasonable tolerance level.
Before proceeding to look into the properties of the estimator in more detail,
I provide a simple example that illustrates the IPF algorithm. Consider Table 3.1
where we have “crude” initial ecological estimates {pkl} and the target marginals
{πk+} and {π+l}. Of course, the first step binary ecological estimates do not nor-
mally produce marginals as inaccurate as it is shown in the example, but recall
that the IPF algorithm was originally introduced to adjust non-representative sur-
vey estimates to conform to the census marginals. Thus, we may think of the
left-hand-side table, the “initial estimates” as any general starting values for the
iteration process. Here, the task is to adjust estimates of the joint probabilities in
the cell to conform to the aggregate marginals.
Table 3.2 shows the iteration process applied to the given example. The first it-
eration consists of forcing the column marginals to conform to the target marginals,
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Initial Estimates (pkl) Target Marginals (πk+ and π+l)
Dem. Indep. Rep. Total Dem. Indep. Rep. Total
Dem. .35 .03 .12 .50 Dem. .3
Indep. .03 .05 .02 .10 Indep. .3
Rep. .02 .07 .31 .40 Rep. .4
Total .40 .15 .45 1.0 Total .5 .2 .3 1.0
Table 3.1: Implementing the IPF Algorithm: An Example
multiplying each row of the initial estimates by the target marginal proportion,
and dividing it with the original marginal proportion. We can see that the row
marginals are adjusted to the target fractions πk+, that are .3, .3, and .4 for the
Democratic, Independent, and the Republican parties, respectively. It should be
noted that the estimated column marginals have changed but do not conform to
the target marginals at this round of iteration.
The second step involves the adjustment of the cells to the column marginals
this time, where estimates of the previous round gets adjusted to correspond to
the target marginals, (.5, .2, .3). The row marginals that were forced to match the
target marginals are changed back, but are now closer to the target marginals. The
last table shows the final converged set of estimates where the initial estimates are
transformed to satisfy the target marginals.
Several remarks are in order. First, this process does not necessarily require the
entries to be probability distributions—it will work with frequency counts as well
where one would simply use marginal count totals instead of the proportions.
This would enable us to deal with situations where the initial estimates from the
binary ecological relationships do not add up to unity. Second, as can be seen
from the algorithm, the adjustments are aimed at finding estimates that transform
pkl minimally, based upon the constraints in Equation (3.11) above.
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First Iteration
Dem. Indep. Rep. Total
Dem. .21 .02 .07 .30
(.35× .3/.5) (.03× .3/.5) (.12× .3/.5)
Indep. .09 .15 .06 .30
(.03× .3/.1) (.05× .3/.1) (.02× .3/.1)
Rep. .02 .07 .31 .40
(.02× .4/.4) (.07× .4/.4) (.31× .4/.4)
Total .32 .24 .44 1.0
Second Iteration
Dem. Indep. Rep. Total
Dem. .33 .02 .05 .39
(.21× .5/.32) (.02× .2/.24) (.07× .3/.44)
Indep. .14 .13 .04 .31
(.09× .5/.32) (.15× .2/.24) (.06× .3/.44)
Rep. .03 .06 .21 .30
(.02× .5/.32) (.07× .2/.24) (.31× .3/.44)
Total .50 .20 .30 1.0
...
Final Convergence
Dem. Indep. Rep. Total
Dem. .27 .01 .02 .3
Indep. .17 .11 .03 .3
Rep. .06 .08 .25 .4
Total .5 .2 .3 1.0
Table 3.2: IPF Iterations: Example Continued
3.4 Simulation using Ballot Images
The 2000 US Presidential Election in Miami-Dade, FL
In this section, I provide simulation results using the 2000 US Presidential Elec-
tion ballot image data from Miami-Dade, Florida, to compare the IPF estimator
against the Thomsen estimator. Other aforementioned ecological inference strate-
gies, for example, the regression approach or the King estimator are not examined
in this section, since we have already established that the crude binary estimates,
that are, the initial values, are plagued by serious biases. They are also the very
different from the Thomsen estimates making the comparison almost meaning-
less. The two estimators that are compared here, namely, the Thomsen estimator
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and the IPF extension of it, share the same identical initial estimates, enabling us
to isolate and evaluate the IPF adjustment. The comparison will focus upon the
biasedness and efficiency of the two estimators.
Before I proceed, it should be noted that there are some difficulties in simulat-
ing aggregate data in general. Simulations will have to mimic the data generating
process closely while carefully introducing the random error component. How-
ever, researchers usually have limited information and tools on how the aggrega-
tion process works in general.2
3.4.1 Point Estimates of IPF
The ballot image data from the 2000 US presidential election in Florida provide
an excellent opportunity to study these issues. After the electoral crisis that went
on in the election concerning the examination of the contested ballots in Florida,
the ballot image data were collected documenting the vote choices of individual
voters in a few problematic counties. For example, we should be able to com-
pute the true proportion of straight-ticket voters that chose to vote for both the
Republican presidential candidate, Bush, and the Republican Senate candidate,
McCollum. This exactly is the definition of the loyalty rate or the “transition” rate
of Republican voters across two elections.
Aggregation of the ballot images by precincts will exactly produce ecological
data that would just embody any unobserved aggregation problems. The first
question is to see how well ecological estimators recover the true parameter from
individual data. Table 3.3 produces individual-level estimates from the ballot im-
age data. As can be seen in the table, about 40% of the voters were straight-ticket
2One exception would be Tom Cho and Anselin (2002) where they try to simulate the aggregation process by using




Presidential Bush 0.404 0.036 0.012
Gore 0.034 0.479 0.024
Others 0.003 0.006 0.002
N = 538, 025
Table 3.3:
Distribution of Voters in Presidential and Senate Contests, Ballot Image Estimates: 2004
General Election, Miami-Dade, Florida
IPF Thomsen
Senate Senate
Rep. Dem. Others Rep. Dem. Others
Presidential Bush 0.412 0.035 0.007 Bush 0.419 0.016 0.007
Gore 0.017 0.483 0.035 Gore 0.021 0.490 0.004
Others 0.007 0.005 0.000 Others 0.014 0.028 0.000
J (Number of Precincts) = 613
Table 3.4:
Distribution of Voters in Presidential and Senate Contests, Ecological Estimates: 2004
General Election, Miami-Dade, Florida
Republican voters, while 48% voted Democratic in both presidential and senate
contests. To produce these estimates, more than half a million ballot image obser-
vations were used, after excluding invalid votes—both “over-votes” and “under-
votes”—and dropping absentee ballots. In any case, treating these as the true
parameters of interest, the ecological estimators are put to test.
Table 3.4 compares ecological estimates retrieved by Thomsen and the IPF ex-
tension of it. The data set was generated by aggregating ballot images into 613
precincts—which exactly should be in the same format as any aggregate data set.
As can be seen, both estimators perform well, especially on the sizable parameters
that represent the straight-ticket voters. The off-diagonal coefficients, however,
namely the fraction of voters who represent the “defection rates,” were somewhat
off the target in the estimates. Among the six off-diagonal estimates, four of them
produced by IPF were clearly closer to the ballot image estimates while only one
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of Thomsen estimates—the Senate Republican voters who also voted for Gore—
was closer to the ballot image estimate. Of course, without any discussion of the
standard error, this comparison is less than clear, however, and I address this issue
in the next section.3
As mentioned, another problem with Thomsen’s multiparty model is that it re-
quires an arbitrary decision of the “reference party” which will work as the base-
line category for all the possible contrast sets. The estimation above was imple-
mented based upon using vote shares of Republican candidates as the “reference
party”: choosing Democrats instead slightly changes the estimates, making them
further away from the true parameters, while using the “Others” category as the
reference produces results that are quite erratic. Thomsen asserts that choosing
a “neutral” and sizable category, such as abstention produces better estimates, a
piece of information that is not always reliably available in many electoral set-
tings. In any case, an arbitrary choice of the reference party remains to be a prob-
lem in the Thomsen estimator, while it is not a problem with the IPF implementa-
tion.
3It is still possible to consider the possibility of applying the IPF algorithm to linear estimators. However, at least for
the Goodman regression, IPF does not apply since the multivariate estimates from a corresponding seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) would exactly conform to the population marginals. In other words, there is noting to “rake.” The
following table provides estimates from SUR.
Senate
Rep. Dem. Others
Presidential Bush 0.460 -0.009 0.006
Gore -0.020 0.511 0.040
Others 0.006 0.011 -0.005
J = 613
Distribution of Voters in Presidential and Senate Contests, Goodman Regression (SUR):
2004 General Election, Miami-Dade, Florida
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3.4.2 Standard Errors and MSE
As was mentioned and implemented in the previous chapter, Achen (2000)
suggested the standard errors of the binary Thomsen estimator using Fisher’s
z-transformation. He suggested computing the 95% confidence intervals of the
estimated aggregate correlation coefficient by







This will enable us to compute the upper and lower bounds of the estimates: di-
viding the difference by 2 or 1.96, provided that the bounds are symmetric around
the point estimates, will approximate the standard error of the estimates. For ex-
ample, it approximately translates to a standard error of .002 in the crude binary
estimate of the Bush-Republican Senate cell, while the standard error of the crude
binary estimate of Others-Bush is around .0035. Applying them as the standard
errors of the above estimates for hypothesis tests, we realize that not many of the
true parameters are within two standard errors of the estimates.
It is possible that the additional IPF transformation of the original crude binary
estimates introduces additional sources of error. However, the complex multivari-
ate transformation will make it prohibitively difficult to trace out such addition of
noise. Here, I design a simulation using the ballot image data to estimate the
standard errors of the estimates.
A straightforward way to proceed is to collect bootstrap standard errors. More
specifically, denote θ̂n as an estimate of a parameter vector based on a sample with
n observations. We try to approximate the statistical properties of θ̂n by collecting
a sample of bootstrap estimators, θ̂(b)m where b = 1, . . . , B, obtained by sampling m
observations with replacement and computing θ̂ with each sample, B times. Then,
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IPF Thomsen
Coefficient Standard Root-MSE Coefficient Standard Root-MSE
Error Error
Bush-Sen. Rep 0.412 0.0114 0.0145 0.419 0.0108 0.0194
Bush-Sen. Dem 0.035 0.0019 0.0021 0.021 0.0022 0.0149
Bush-Sen. Others 0.007 0.0006 0.0043 0.014 0.0012 0.0029
Gore-Sen. Rep 0.017 0.0020 0.0175 0.016 0.0017 0.0187
Gore-Sen. Dem 0.483 0.0110 0.0115 0.490 0.0106 0.0153
Gore-Sen. Others 0.035 0.0011 0.0102 0.028 0.0017 0.0037
Others-Sen. Rep 0.007 0.0003 0.0033 0.007 0.0004 0.0038
Others-Sen. Dem 0.005 0.0003 0.0010 0.004 0.0004 0.0013
Others-Sen. Others 0.000 0.0000 0.0022 0.000 0.0000 0.0023
Table 3.5: Bootstrap Estimates of Coefficients and Their Precision

















The key statistic that enables us to study the covariance structure is the dif-
ference between the bootstrap estimator θ̂(b)m and the usual estimator on the full
sample, θ̂n. What is especially nice about the particular feature of the data set is
that it enables us to get estimates of the mean squared error terms, which is an-
other important criterion of the estimators here. Table 3.5 reports results of such
estimates.
The results are from B = 500 repetitions of bootstrap simulation, although esti-
mates of the standard errors converge fairly quickly with around B = 50. First of
all, the estimated standard errors are comparable between the two estimators, in-
dicating an equivalent level of efficiency. The standard errors of the larger entries
such as the straight-ticket voters are both at around the 1% point mark, putting the
true values of the coefficients within the confidence intervals. In a way, this just
confirms the conventional understanding that ecological estimators come with
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sizable biases and inadequately small and underestimated standard errors.




, and it is evident that IPF implementation of Thomsen has smaller MSE
than that of the Thomsen estimator. This mostly is due to the fact that the IPF
estimator is at least as efficient as that of Thomsen’s, but comes with less amount
of bias.
The complexity of the IPF adjustment as well as most of the multiparty esti-
mation strategies I reviewed here makes it difficult to derive analytically various
measures of uncertainty of the estimators. In addition, applying the IPF proce-
dure in this particular context of adjusting the ecological estimation introduces
more complexity into the analytical process.4 In this section, I have provided re-
sults from a bootstrap simulation that supports the usage of the IPF estimator over
the Thomsen estimator in multiparty system.
3.5 Empirical Test: Voter Transition in South Korean Presidential Elections
1992–1997
Here, I test different ecological estimation strategies as defined previously on
the voter transition in South Korean presidential elections between 1992 and 1997.
Setting aside some methodological considerations for a while, there are several
substantively interesting issues involving the voter transition in these two elec-
tions.
First of all, the voter transition in the two elections provides a good starting
point by letting us test and calibrate ecological inference techniques before we
can move onto other elections. The 1992 and 1997 presidential elections featured
4For example, Little and Wu (1991) derive the standard error of the IPF estimator in the context of raking survey esti-
mates to match census results, where they specify it to be only applicable to the cases where two sets of estimates are not
correlated to each other. In the particular context of adjusting the first-round ecological estimates, this condition exactly is
violated and their results do not apply.
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similar configuration of parties, including a major candidate—Kim Dae Jung—
running in both of them. Arguably, the five years between the two elections stands
as a politically stationary period, which is a rarity in South Korean politics. With
the availability of the survey data that can provide corresponding individual-level
estimates for voter transition, we have a very good setup to check the accuracy
and adequacy of ecological estimators on Korean elections.
In a way, the movement of voters is an important issue in studying a political
system where parties are yet to be institutionalized. Suppose we are interested in
finding out how capable Korean voters are to make consistent electoral choices.
Given the fluid structure of the party system and frequent changes in party labels,
it more often than not is the candidates (or importantly, political bosses) that pro-
vide the sense of continuity in the South Korean party system. The voter transi-
tion rates model will offer an important insight into the evolution of South Korean
politics—how strong the politics of personalities is; how relevant party labels are;
and whether “old politics” is in the process of being phased out by more institu-
tionalized sets of party politics.
If individual-level data are available, we should be able to trace this back to
the start of the country and learn the dynamic transformation in the calculus of
the Korean voters. However, survey studies are not available for elections before
1987, and the only data available are aggregate-level data: thus, there are the a
typical ecological inference problems. The elections 1992–1997 provide interesting
leverage in the sense that they enable us to test whether and which ecological
inference strategies provide reasonable answers for the voter transition problem
in South Korean elections: by comparing ecological estimates to survey results.
Moreover, the transitions of voters between the two elections have interesting
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1987 1992 1997
Roh Tae Woo (36%) Kim Young Sam (40%) Lee Hoe Chang (39%)
Kim Young Sam (27%) Kim Dae Jung (32%) Kim Dae Jung (40%)
Kim Dae Jung (26%) Chung Ju Young (16%) Lee In Je (19%)
Table 3.6: Candidates in Presidential Elections, 1987–1997
implications per se. As noted, the 1997 election was the first time in South Korean
history when a presidential candidate from the “opposite” party, namely, Kim
Dae Jung, won the election, after his three unsuccessful bid for the presidency. It
would be interesting to find out how loyal his former supporters were and what
constitutes his new support base.
3.5.1 Background and Data
Before going into the details of the estimation, a quick review of the “data-
generating process” is in order. Especially when engaging in an ecological infer-
ence estimation, the researcher should provide some relevant “external informa-
tion” that could help our inference.
The year 1987 witnessed the first democratic presidential election in South Ko-
rea since the start of the series of authoritarian regimes in 1972. Although it is
still a matter of debate how meaningful elections were before 1987, it is safe to say
that presidential elections became competitive and politically significant after the
1987 election5. The three elections shown in Table 3.6 were marked by regionally
divided close races. None of the winners won the contest by more than an 8%
margin of the total votes cast. None of the winners were able to gain a national
majority support.
5Several presidential elections (1952, 1956, 1963, 1967, and 1971) that took place before the authoritarian regime were
arguably competitive, although the governing bloc always won the competition by fairly comfortable margins.
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Roh Tae Woo, the candidate from the ruling party in the authoritarian govern-
ment before the democratization, came out as the winner of the 1987 election. Kim
Young Sam, a former opposition leader, won the 1992 election after joining the
governing party. In 1997, Kim Dae Jung, who lost in the two previous elections,
became the first opposition party candidate to defeat a ruling party opponent.
Many interesting and substantive questions can be asked based on voter transi-
tion behavior: for example, how was this first alternation of power between the
competing parties (Huntington 1991: 266–267) achieved? Are Korean voters loyal
to parties or the party bosses?
Even though the Korean party system is not stable and exhibits frequent changes
in party labels, there is a significant degree of consistency in political support that
is comparable to party identification in established democracies. In other words,
voters manage to find, identify, and vote for “their” parties and candidates, even
when party names change quite frequently. This fact is sufficient to justify the
application of the voter transition model to the Korean electorate and clarify the
meaning of “loyalty” or “defection” rates in this chapter.
Two data sets of Korean presidential elections are used in this chapter: an
aggregate level election data set and one survey study. To build the aggregate
data set, election results of the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections were
matched to each other. The official election results are reported at the precinct
level, the numbers of which add up to around 15,300 and 16,400 for the two elec-
tions. The observations had to be aggregated to an administrative unit (“Dong”) in
the matching process, resulting in about 3,500 observations. The number of units
is further reduced to 3,380 after dropping those with the population change ratio
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over 100% and below 50%.6
A survey data set is used to compare the results from the aggregate estima-
tion of voter transition rates. The data set is from the National Survey of the Fif-
teenth Presidential Election conducted by the Korean Social Science Data Center.
One thousand and two hundred respondents were randomly sampled from the
national voter registration list: the sampling quotas were assigned by region, gen-
der, and age, based on the corresponding census proportions record. The sur-
vey started on the next day after the 1997 election and ended on the fourth day.
Among the questionnaires in the original data set, two key variables are taken to
form a cross tabulation: who the respondents voted for in the 1997 election and
their recall of whom they had voted for in the previous presidential election, 5
years ago. Cross tabulations of the survey are used as references for the reliability
of the ecological estimates in the next section.
It is a well-established fact that survey results are by no means perfect indica-
tors of true voting behavior: respondents often forget or lie. For example, one of
the sure predictions in survey research is the over-reporting of turnout: more re-
spondents will claim to have voted in post-election interviews than actually cast
ballots (Traugott and Katosh 1979; Duff et al. 2007). Also, recalls of previous votes
are, at best, not without noise. For example, Blair Weir (1974) finds a post-election
“bandwagon effect” toward the winner from 1956-58-60 Survey Research Center
panel data of US voters.
Table 3.7 compares the survey estimates to the actual outcome (from the aggre-
6A potential problem stemming from these dropped cases should be mentioned. The units with the highest population
increase are mostly the suburban areas of Seoul and Pusan (“bed-town areas”), where the residents tend to be more edu-
cated, younger, and employed middle class. Significant population decrease tends to occur mostly in rural areas where the
residents are on average older, less educated and agriculture-based people with lower income. No study yet has clarified
the relationship between these variables and partisan voting, which is an important substantive issue itself, but here, we
just assume that the deletions are not systematic.
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gate data used) of the two elections. We can see a number of sizable discrepancies
between the corresponding results of the two data sets. First, in both elections,
there are around 11% of over-report of turnout in the survey data. Second, the re-
sponses regarding the 1997 election, right after which the survey was conducted,
show relatively less discrepancy with the actual outcome, except for the turnout.
However, a serious amount of disagreement exists between the aggregate and
survey data sets for Kim Young Sam and Chung Joo Young’s support in 1992.
Although the sources of the problems are unknown, several hypothetical ex-
planations can be provided. First, the over-reporting of Kim YS support in the
survey is consistent with the “bandwagon effect.” Some respondents could have
forgotten whom they actually had voted for 5 years ago, and could have answered
that they voted for Kim YS who won the election and had been serving as the Pres-
ident since. Second, the under-reporting of Chung’s support in the survey could
be due to the fact that the candidate’s party was made ad hoc right before the elec-
tion and vanished right after Chungs defeat in the 1992 election. This ephemeral
nature of the party could have encouraged the respondents to forget or to hide
their previous support for Chung.
The survey estimate of the defection rate from Chung JY to Kim DJ will also
likely to have a positive bias since Chung’s previous supporters are under-reporting
while Kim DJ’s 1997 support is inflated. In both cases, there are good reasons to
believe that the true loyalty rate is smaller than the survey estimate, and any eco-
logical estimate larger than the survey estimate is likely to be biased—more biased
than the survey estimate.
However, despite these problems, the three party contest captured by the sur-
vey is somewhat workable. The point here is that the survey estimates are not
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Candidates Aggregate Survey
1992 Election Turnout 83% 94%
Kim Young Sam 45% 52%
Kim Dae Jung 36% 35%
Chung Joo Young 18% 13%
1997 Election Turnout 81% 92%
Lee Hoe Chang 39% 39%
Kim Dae Jung 41% 43%
Lee In Je 20% 18%
Note: The percentages for “Abstention” were calculated based on the total number of eligible
voters in both data sets and both elections. Because of the large over-reporting of turnout, entries
for each candidate represent percentages of the three party vote only.
Table 3.7: National Support for Candidates: Survey vs Aggregate
perfect but the best we have and there are still certain ways to make better use of
them as points of reference. Even though survey data will not provide the perfect
“truth” that we can use as a reference for our ecological estimation, it should be
sufficient for our purpose where we test and compare different classes of ecologi-
cal estimators.
3.5.2 Results
As was shown, three major candidates competed in the two elections. The
party system in Korea can be characterized as a “two-and-a-half” party system:
two major parties compete against each other, while numbers of parties and pres-
idential candidates have always taken a distant but still noticeable third place. In
1992 and 1997, none of the third candidates gained less then 16% of the total na-
tional vote; and those two third-party candidates from both elections, Chung Joo
Young and Lee In Je, are not directly linked to each other. As was described in
the previous section, multiparty estimations require even more sets of strong as-
sumptions and accordingly, the results are unstable. Thus the setup is in a sense
a severe test to check the reliability and consistency of the estimators. How we
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denote the candidates and the parameters of interest is shown in Figure 3.3.
1992
1997 Kim Young Sam Kim Dae Jung Chung Joo Young Total
Lee Hoe Chang pRR pDR pSR R2
Kim Dae Jung pRR pDD pSD D2
Lee In Je 1− pRR − pRD 1− pDR − pDD 1− pSR − pSD S2
Total R1 D1 S1 1
Figure 3.3: Variables and Parameters of Voter Transition Rates: South Korean Presidential Elec-
tions, 1992–1997
Table 3.8 provides the estimated voter transition rates of various estimators.
“Survey” refers to the estimates from the cross-tabulation of reported votes in the
two elections. Thus, the coefficients would mean the probability to vote for the
time-2 candidate given s/he voted for a particular time-1 candidate. The survey
estimates raise some interesting points, although most of the estimates look rea-
sonable.
One picture that emerges from the survey estimates on transition rates is that
Kim Dae Jung was able to draw sizable support from those who voted against
him—especially from previous Kim Young Sam voters—even though he lost some
of his previous supporters. In fact, this is consistent with Kim Dae Jung’s central
electoral strategy where he tried to change his leftist image and form a new con-
servative coalition, which also is known as the “New DJ Plan.”
Meanwhile, some would argue that the loyalty rate of Kim Dae Jung at 87%
is less than impressive given the fact that he had enjoyed a monolithic electoral
support from those who are from Chunla region; and from those who are younger,
liberal, and who feel strongly against the traditional ruling bloc that used be in
charge of the authoritarian regime before the democratization of the country. In
other words, it was his ever-loyal supporters that won Kim the 1997 election. His
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supporters were in strong contrast to the GNP supporters many of whom changed
their party of choice and supported Lee In Je.
Was it the monolithic supporters that won Kim the election and the presidency?
Or was it the “New DJ Plan” that tapped new political support for him? In any
case, these are empirical questions, and it is possible to see which storyline the
aggregate estimates confirm.
The sub-table in Table 3.8 labeled “Goodman” shows results from linear regres-
sions on the system of equations
R2 = pRRR1 + pDRD1 + pSRS1
D2 = pRDR1 + pDDD1 + pSDS1
where the variables and parameters are defined in Figure 3.3. As was the case
with binary estimations, we still observe out-of-bounds estimates; in this case, co-
efficients larger than unity and smaller than zero at the same time. However, the
Goodman results seem to support the monolithic-supporter hypothesis, where
the estimation shows that Kim (more than) perfectly retained his electoral sup-
port from the previous election, and that was almost enough for him to win the
election, where Lee In Je took about 30% of the former GNP votes. In any case,
the negative transition rates are biased, and so is the loyalty rate for Kim.
The overestimation of the Kim Dae Jung loyalty rate continues to be the prob-
lem from the bivariate estimation. As was argued above, if the survey estimate
of 86.7% is already an overestimate, we can be quite confident that the Goodman
estimate is biased, and more likely than not biased even from the true value of the
coefficient.
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Survey KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.6311 0.0430 0.3429
KimDJ97 0.1748 0.8674 0.3571
LeeIJ97 0.1942 0.0896 0.3000
Goodman KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.7171 -0.0101 0.2970
KimDJ97 -0.0033 1.0196 0.2758
LeeIJ97 0.2863 -0.0095 0.4272
Constrained KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.7079 0.0100 0.2926
KimDJ97 0.0100 0.9800 0.2939
LeeIJ97 0.2821 0.0100 0.4135
King KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.7720 0.0060 0.2328
KimDJ97 0.0477 0.9608 0.2112
LeeIJ97 0.1803 0.0332 0.5560
King-MLE KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.7280 0.0065 0.3441
KimDJ97 0.0577 0.9542 0.1990
LeeIJ97 0.2143 0.0393 0.4570
Thomsen KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.6211 0.0720 0.4815
KimDJ97 0.1446 0.8167 0.2682
LeeIJ97 0.2343 0.1112 0.2503
Thomsen-IPF KimYS92 KimDJ92 Chung92
LeeHC97 0.6124 0.1260 0.3936
KimDJ97 0.1268 0.8549 0.2339
LeeIJ97 0.2608 0.0192 0.3726
Table 3.8: Ecological Estimates from a Three Party System: South Korean Elections 1992–1997
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Note that the next sub-table produces estimates from constrained regressions,
where certain adjustments are applied to the Goodman regression to make sure
the estimates of each column add up to 1 in a way that is consistent to the cross-
equation correlations that was developed in the previous section. Following the
details of the previous section on how the adjustment for constrained regressions
was applied, the Goodman coefficients are “corrected.” For example, since all the
loyalty and defection rates for Kim DJ are out of bounds, we set them to be .98,
.01, and .01 before going into the second round of estimation. The results are not
drastically different from the Goodman regression.
For King’s model, this chapter adopts Equation (3.10) where Chung Joo Young’s
vote was used as the “neutral” party that is collapsed to the other major parties
to retrieve binary estimates. The fact that he nor the party did not last until the
next election justifies this selection. Moreover, Chung support is the least corre-
lated with other candidates. I also report the result of using the same procedure
on King’s first-round estimates (the MLE estimates before simulation) generated
by EI and label it as “King-MLE.”
The results are quite interesting considering the pattern that we have seen
from the previous chapter. Substantively, it does not differ from the linear re-
gression results, but it should be noted that the estimate of GNP loyalty rate
(KimYS92→LeeHC97) is at 77%, which is larger than the survey estimate and
worse than the Goodman estimate. It appears that all the loyalty rates, or the
main-diagonal entries, are inflated while the rest are underestimated—at least
compared to the survey estimates.
The table also provides estimates implementing Thomsen’s method into the
multiparty context, as was described in detail in the previous section and was re-
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trieved by his program ECOL. The third candidates in the two elections, namely,
Chung Joo Young in 1992 and Lee In Je in 1997 elections were used as the “refer-
ence categories” under the reasoning that they are the more “neutral” candidates.
Finally, I also report the iterative proportional estimate applied to the probit
version of Thomsen’s estimator at the bottom of the table. As seen earlier, the
difference between the two sets of estimates is that the former implements logit
specification and tetrachoric correlation while the later uses probit specification
and IPF, as was documented in the previous chapter and in the previous section.
The results approximate the survey estimates better than any other ecologi-
cal estimators, supporting the “New DJ Plan” argument, which attributes Kim
Dae Jung’s success to his newly-found support basis. More specifically, it high-
lights the fact that Kim lost some of his support from the previous election, while
managed to gain some political ground from previous GNP supporters. Another
noticeable fact is that the transition rates from Chung Joo Young (the last column)
are quite different from the survey results—where survey estimates are the least
reliable due to the response problems we have seen in Table 3.7.
The difference between the two versions of the Thomsen estimator mainly in-
volves the transition rates from Kim Dae Jung support in 1992. The loyalty rate
from the IPF version approximates closer to the survey estimate than Thomsen’s
own ECOL estimate. Among the two, the question on which estimate is better is
still inconclusive, mostly due to the possibility that the survey estimate could be
an overestimation, as noted above. Also, both Thomsen estimators highlight the
fact that Kim Dae Jung in 1997 did not do any better among the previous Chung
supporters, which contradicts the survey estimates. However, noting that the sur-
vey estimate for this may be biased upwards due to the under-report of Chung
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supporters, we suspect the survey estimate (36%) may be inflated and can reason-
ably argue the ecological estimate may represent the truth better.
3.6 Remarks
Continuing the trend in the previous chapter, the approach suggested by Thom-
sen, and especially the IPF implementation of it, produce better estimates. Here,
in the multiparty implementation of the ecological estimators, it appears that es-
timations from the initial binary configurations dominate the final result. If the
initial step gives results erroneous by a sizable margin, getting a reliable final re-
sult is almost impossible. Although none of the initial estimation is passed on to
the next stage unchanged, any erroneous first estimate would accordingly inflate
or deflate other first step estimates—even if they are correct.
In this regard, getting a good first-order estimate is important. It is possible to
think of adjusting any first-round two-by-two estimates with the IPF algorithm.
However, since IPF tries to minimize the change of estimates from the initial val-
ues in the adjustment process, the bias introduced in the initial stage will carry
over to the converged final IPF estimate. Moreover, the Goodman regression or
SUR will always produce estimates that exactly conform to the target marginals,
thus IPF adjustment is not applicable to them.
There is still more work to be done investigating the properties and possibilities
of the multiparty extension of various ecological estimators. In this chapter, I
introduced the use of the iterative proportional fitting process in the context of
adjusting first-round binary estimates. After looking into the IPF adjustment to the
Thomsen estimator, I have shown some evidence that it may be the best ecological
estimator we have so far studying multiparty voter transition rates.
CHAPTER IV
Ecological Inference with Covariates
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed an important extension to the ecological infer-
ence techniques: its application to multinomial choices. In this chapter, I will pro-
pose another extension to the basic model: how to incorporate covariates. The ex-
tension I develop here mainly focuses upon Thomsen’s model which was shown
to be the best estimator so far in studying the voter transition problem. This will
prove to be the critical step for ecological inference techniques in analyzing the
underlying forces that govern the dynamic electoral process.
To be sure, the voter transition model in itself has merits in understanding elec-
toral dynamics. However, usually a researcher will want to move a step further
than a mere description of loyalty and defection rates, and to understand the
mechanism behind the movement of the voters. For example, in the previous
chapter, with the help of ecological inference techniques, it was possible to esti-
mate the proportion of straight-ticket voters in Miami-Dade, Florida to be around
90%. But who are they and what characterizes the 10% of those who split their
electoral support to candidates from different parties? Or, as was shown in the
South Korean example, it was possible to recover the retention rate of Kim Dae
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Jung supporters—but the more substantively interesting task would be to iden-
tify the driving forces of such (non)movement of the voters. In the framework of
the voter transition model discussed so far, it is not possible to ask such questions
yet.
In this chapter, I first develop an extension to the Thomsen estimator and spell
out the logic behind it. Later, I apply the extension to study the impact of democ-
ratization in South Korean elections.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The Voter Transition Setup with Covariates
Essentially, we are interested in the difference in the voter transition rates among
different demographic groups. The question would be equivalent to modeling the
loyalty and defection rates as functions of the covariate. Suppose we are inter-
ested in the transition rates of workers, where a binary variable zi would indicate
whether an individual is a worker or not. If we had individual-level survey data,
we would be able to estimate the parameters by a three-way cross tabulation, as
is depicted by Figure 4.1, where xi indicates the vote choice of individual i at time
1, and yi indicates that at time 2.
Worker (zi = 1) Non-Worker (zi = 0)
xi = 1 xi = 0 xi = 1 xi = 0
yi = 1 p1 q1 p0 q0
yi = 0 1− p1 1− q1 1− p0 1− q0
Figure 4.1: Voter Transition with a Covariate
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In the same manner shown in the previous chapter, we should be able to write
a regression relationship at the individual level as
Pr(yi = 1) = pixi + qi(1− xi)
where pi = p1zi + p0(1− zi)
qi = q1zi + q0(1− zi)
Or equivalently, we may write
yi = zi [p1xi + q1(1− xi)] + (1− zi) [p0xi + q0(1− xi)] + ui (4.1)
which is a fully saturated interactive model between the electoral choice and a
covariate. Reorganizing the equation above yields
yi = q0 + (q1 − q0)zi + (p0 − q0)xi + [(p1 − q1)− (p0 − q0)] xizi + ui. (4.2)
which is displayed in the usual OLS form of yi = α + γzi + βxi + δxizi + ui. Loy-
alty and defection rate parameters in the two groups are all identified since
q0 = α
q1 = α + γ
p0 = α + β
p1 = α + β + γ + δ.
In other words, with individual-level data, OLS will exactly produce the parame-
ters in Figure 4.1, and the estimate will have the usual desirable properties since
E(ui) = 0 and Cov(ui, xi) = Cov(ui, zi) = 0.
But what about the aggregate relationship? It is not straightforward to de-
rive the aggregate equivalent of the equation analytically in the same fashion that
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was demonstrated in Chapter 2, where the Goodman regression was derived. For
example, by averaging both sides of Equation (4.2), we may try to derive the re-
lationship between the aggregate variables, Yj, Xj, and Zj, namely, party support
in the two elections and the proportion of workers in district j, in the following
manner. Averaging both sides of Equation (4.2) in district j, with nj total voters,
would yield
Yj = q0 + (q1 − q0)Zj + (p0 − q0)Xj + [(p1 − q1)− (p0 − q0)] ∑i xizinj . (4.3)
If xi and zi are not correlated, then Cov(xi, zi) = 1nj ∑i xizi − XjZj = 0, in which
case we should have an aggregate level regression relationship that corresponds
to Equation (4.2). This implies that even when the Goodman assumption of the
constant parameter holds, a Goodman regression does not exist when it comes to
estimating the impact of covariates that are correlated with the main independent
variable.
4.2.2 Revisiting the Thomsen Estimator
Extending the Thomsen model to have covariates is not straightforward. In
this section, I will reinterpret the Thomsen estimator to be a method of moment
estimator and develop an extension of it that allows the inclusion of covariates
into the model.
In Chapter 2, it was shown that the Thomsen model is based upon the individual-
level utility of voting for a given party in two elections which are assumed to
distribute joint-bivariate normal in the population, with means µx and µy and
correlation ρ between them:
f (x∗i , y
∗
i ) = N 2(µx, µy; ρ). (4.4)
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Voter decisions are simply a function of these random variables. If the utilities
to vote for a given party in the two elections, x∗i and y
∗
i , exceed a threshold, which
can be set at zero for identification, the voter will cast her ballot for the party;
otherwise, she will vote for the opposing party. This is a usual probit setup where
voting for a given party in elections can be denoted as indicator variables, say, xi
for election 1 and yi for election 2.
xi = 1 if x∗i > 0, otherwise, xi = 0 (4.5)
yi = 1 if y∗i > 0, otherwise, yi = 0.
Then, quite simply, we can see that our quantity of interest can be retrieved by
evaluating








N 2(x∗i , y∗i |µx, µy, ρ)dx∗i dy∗i (4.6)
where the double integration would estimate the probability that a voter supports
a given party in both elections. The task then would be to estimate the three
parameters of the bivariate-normal distribution, namely, the means of the two
utility distributions, µx, µy, and their correlation, ρ.
First of all, since the µx is the mean of the normally distributed x∗i , we may
write from Equation (4.5) as
E [Pr(xi = 1)] =
∫ ∞
0






where φ(z) denotes the standard normal density function and Φ(z) is the cumula-
tive standard normal function. In a similar fashion, we may define E [Pr(yi = 1)] =
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Φ(µy).
It is straightforward to retrieve these two population parameters from the sam-
ple moments, since E [Pr(xi = 1)] and E [Pr(yi = 1)] are the respective first mo-
ments of the two binary variable, that is, the sample means. Note that this quan-
tity can directly be retrieved by the weighted averages of the aggregate data:













where Xj and Yj denote the proportion of party supporters in district j and nj is
the number of total voters in the district. N is the total number of national votes,
so ∑j nj = N. The parameters of interest, µxand µy can be retrieved by inverting
the probit function. Note that even though the actual estimates will be computed
from the aggregate data, the quantities exactly are the first moments of individual
level samples. In short, there is no cross-level inference, yet.
The third parameter, the correlation coefficient, can be written in terms of the
sample moments as well, although inestimable because they are not observed di-
rectly:
ρ = Corr [x∗i , y
∗
i ] . (4.8)
First, add a subscript j to the variables to indicate the district to which the voter






. Note that the aggregate-level
information we have is in the form of
















Binary variables for vote choices
in time 1 and time 2 Xj and Yj
Corresponding aggregate
supports in District j
zi
Binary variable indicating an
individual attribute Zj
Corresponding aggregate






to vote for a given party that
determines xi and yi.
Pr(xi = 1) = Φ(x∗i ) and





utilities of voters in district j to
vote for a given party. Estimated
by Φ−1(Xj) and Φ−1(Yj).
Table 4.1: Key Variables in the Extended Thomsen Model with a Covariate
within district j, respectively. According to Thomsen, these can be thought of
as means of district-level distributions of individual utilities to vote for a given
party.











, can replace equation (4.8), when the
ratio of the systematic versus the non-systematic parts of x∗i and y
∗
i equal the same
ratio in X∗j and Y
∗
j respectively. A more detailed discussion on the assumption
can be found in the earlier section that derives the condition in Equation (2.17). If
we can establish that the probit transformed variables distribute normal, standard
estimates from its sample moments and correlations will be consistent, converging
in probability (Greene 2005).
Before I proceed, I will define key variables and parameters involved in the
extended Thomsen model with covariates. Table 4.1 provides summary of the
variables at both individual and aggregate levels: in general, individual manifest
variables, such as xi and yi, are binary variables, while their counterparts are the
aggregated fraction of them at district j and are conventionally written in upper
case.
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4.2.3 Extending the Thomsen Estimator
A. Two Joint-Bivariate Normal Distributions
As was shown in the previous section, the Thomsen estimator assumes that the
two key latent variables that underlie the electoral choice is joint-bivariate nor-
mally distributed. To add a covariate, we can think about the variables, (x∗i , y
∗
i ),
as draws from a mixture of two joint-bivariate distributions. More specifically, the
probability density function of the two latent variables that capture voters’ utility
to support a given party in the two elections can be defined as:
f (x∗i , y
∗









In other words, if a voter belongs to a particular group of interest—say, if she is
a worker—, then her latent utilities to vote for the party in the two elections is
drawn from the first bivariate normal distribution, N 21 ; otherwise, they are drawn
from the second distribution,N 22 . There are six parameters to estimate to compute
the transition rates in the two groups, three from each distribution.
One important point to make here is that such demographic variables, say, pro-
portion of workers or the gender distribution, has a radically different theoretical
interpretation from the vote shares within the context of the Thomsen model. As
was argued in Chapter 2, and sketched in the previous section, voting for a given
party in elections is set up as an outcome of an underlying partisanship of a voter.
In fact, neither yi or xi are exogenous to each other—Thomsen is only interested
in studying the correlation between the two. On the contrary, many types of co-
variates, such as demographic variables, are truly exogenous variables that are
measured directly. In the model above, they are accordingly set up as strictly ex-
ogenous factors that determine to which (joint-normal) distribution the sample
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belongs. Our task then is to study how different the two distributions are and use
them to find out the transition rates in the two different demographic groups.
The key variables x∗i and y
∗
i are latent utility variables and if they were observed
at the individual-level, we should be able to estimate directly the population pa-
rameters with the sample moments. However, since we do not have that informa-
tion, it is necessary to take a detour and estimate auxiliary parameters that will
help us study the two distributions. Since the voter preferences are distributed
joint-bivariate normal in each group, it is possible to write the following regres-
sion relationships that accompany the two distribution functions:
y∗i = α1 + β1x
∗
i + ui,1 if zi = 1
y∗i = α0 + β0x
∗
i + ui,0 if zi = 0.
In a similar fashion that was shown in Equation (4.7), we may equate the first
population moments to the sample means of probabilities to vote:
Φ(µ̂y,1) = E [Pr(yi = 1|zi = 1)] = E [Φ (α1 + β1x∗i + ui,1)] (4.10)
Φ(µ̂y,0) = E [Pr(yi = 1|zi = 0)] = E [Φ (α0 + β0x∗i + ui,0)] (4.11)
The significance of the above expression is that once we estimate the auxiliary
parameters, β’s and α’s, we should be able to get estimates of µy,1 and µy,0 in terms
of the function of x∗ and x∗ only. Most importantly, as can be seen in the right hand
side of the above equations, we do not have to worry about the covariate, zi, any
more once we collect the the auxiliary parameters.
In a symmetric fashion, write the reversed regression relationship with x∗i as
the dependent variable and y∗ as the independent variable such as
x∗i = δ1 + γ1y
∗
i + ei,1 if zi = 1
x∗i = δ0 + γ0y
∗
i + ei,0 if zi = 0
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This may look counter-intuitive to have an earlier election as the dependent vari-
able and a later election as the independent variable, but since the model does not
claim any direct causal relationship between the two electoral variables—and they
are only linked by a correlation—there is nothing that prohibits this. A different
way to understand this is to say that it is the joint-distribution parameters of x∗i
and y∗i that matter for our purpose, and regression coefficients are just auxiliary
parameters to help us study the distributions. Thus, we write
Φ(µ̂x,1) = E [Pr(xi = 1|zi = 1)] = E [Φ (δ1 + γ1y∗i + ei,1)] (4.12)
Φ(µ̂x,0) = E [Pr(xi = 1|zi = 0)] = E [Φ (δ0 + γ0y∗i + ei,0)] (4.13)
The question now is how to estimate the four µ parameters with aggregate data.
Take, the example of Equation (4.10). Once we have estimates of the auxiliary
parameters, the expected value of the right-hand-side expression can be written























The idea is to replace the individual utilities, x∗i in district j, with X
∗
j , the probit-
transformed district vote shares of the party which are assumed to be the district
means of aggregate utilities. Even though this is the solution I have at the cur-
rent stage, it is not the perfect solution: the estimates will be slightly biased since




) is not always the mean of probit-transformed
variables. (x∗i ).
1 However, it is not an unreasonable solution, as similar replace-
1There also is another source of bias in the equation. Since the expected value of the error term inside the cumulative
normal function will not be zero in general, the estimates will slightly be biased.
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ment was done in the simple Thomsen model.
The last expression shows that this can be computed by the weighted average
of the aggregate sample. Note that expected turnout in district j is weighted by
the number of the population group in the district, Zjnj. Following similar lines of
logic, the rest of the necessary mean parameters of the two joint-bivariate normal

























Now to estimate the correlation parameter for the two joint distributions, we
may write:
ρ̂21 = β̂1 · γ̂1 (4.18)
ρ̂20 = β̂0 · γ̂0 (4.19)
noting that the product of two reversed bivariate slope regression coefficients take
the form of Cov(x,y)Var(x) ×
Cov(x,y)
Var(y) = Corr
2(x, y). These complete the full two sets of pa-
rameters that are necessary to evaluate the two bivariate normal distributions.
Quandt and Ramsey (1978) analyzed the problem of estimating parameters of
such mixtures of normal distributions, and showed that the method of moment
estimates are consistent. Estimates of the transition rates in the two different pop-
ulation groups are continuous functions of those consistent estimators, and hence
consistent.
So far, I outlined how to estimate parameters of the two joint bivariate normal
distributions from which the two groups of voters are modeled to be sampled. The
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six equations, (4.14)-(4.19), provide formulas to estimate the parameters, using
auxiliary regression parameters. Now the task left is to show how to estimate
them.
B. Estimating the Auxiliary Parameters
The auxiliary regression models can be incorporated into the following two
sets of nonlinear equations:
Pr(yi = 1|zi) = ziΦ [α1 + β1x∗i + ui,1] + (1− zi)Φ [α0 + β0x∗i + ui,0] (4.20)
Pr(xi = 1|zi) = ziΦ [δ1 + γ1y∗i + ei,1] + (1− zi)Φ [δ0 + γ0y∗i + ei,0] (4.21)
These equations are not estimable directly, since we do not have individual-level
information, and the latent variables are unobservable. A good starting point is to
sum the equations using the observed exogenous variable, zi.
Now suppose within district j, the probability to draw a voter belonging to a
demographic group of, say, the workers, will equal Zj, then we may replace zi
with Zj, and write
Pr(yi = 1|j) = ZjΦ [α1 + β1x∗i + ui,1] + (1− Zj)Φ [α0 + β0x∗i + ui,0] (4.22)
Pr(xi = 1|j) = ZjΦ [δ1 + γ1y∗i + ei,1] + (1− Zj)Φ [δ0 + γ0y∗i + ei,0] (4.23)
Taking the expectations within district j, we have
Yj = ZjE (Φ [α1 + β1x∗i + ui,1]) + (1− Zj)E (Φ [α0 + β0x∗i + ui,0])
Xj = ZjE (Φ [δ1 + γ1y∗i + ei,1]) + (1− Zj)E (Φ [δ0 + γ0y∗i + ei,0])
Resorting to the same assumption that expectations of the cumulative normal
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Both equations can be estimated by non-linear least squares or maximum likeli-
hood with the identifying conditions: α0 6= α1 or β0 6= β1 for Equation (4.24) and
δ0 6= δ1 or γ0 6= γ1 for Equation (4.25). In the trivially special case where Zj is
not continuous and is a binary variable indicating whether the unit is, say, urban
(Zj = 1) or rural (Zj = 0), the estimation is equivalent to collecting two sets of pa-
rameters in the simple transition problem without covariates, from two separate
groups of geographic units.
With these results, it is now possible to estimate the voter transition model with
covariates. In the following section, I demonstrate how the technique developed
in this section can be applied to a real voter transition problem.
4.2.4 Estimation: The Thomsen Estimator with Covariates
In this section, I will provide a step-by-step example of the model developed in
the previous section, using the example of the turnout rates in the South Korean
elections in 1981-1985. The covariate here is the fraction of the more educated
voters with college degrees or higher education. Using the model developed in
the previous section, I will demonstrate that it is possible to estimate i) the turnout
rates in the two different demographic groups and ii) the transition rates between
the two elections in the two different groups.
1. (DEFINITION OF VARIABLES) First, definitions of the variables are as follows:
Xj: Turnout in the 1981 Election in District j;
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X∗j : The inverse probit transformation of Xj, that is Φ
−1(Xj);
Yj: Turnout in the 1985 Election in District j;
Y∗j : The inverse probit transformation of Yj, that is Φ
−1(Yj);
Zj: Proportion of more educated voters, with in District j; and
nj: The total number of eligible voters in district j.











The estimation can be carried out by maximum likelihood or nonlinear least











3. (PROJECTED TURNOUTS OF THE TWO GROUPS IN THE SECOND ELEC-
TION) The next step is to compute the predicted probabilities to turnout in
the two groups.
















Note that the predicted probabilities in the two population groups are weighted
by the group sizes. The estimates indicate that around 85% of the more ed-
ucated voters turned out in the 1985 election, while the turnout rate among
other voters is estimated to be around 81%.
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These two estimates constitute the first set of parameters that define the means
of the two joint-bivariate normal distributions
µ̂y,1 = Φ−1 (.850) = 1.036
µ̂y,0 = Φ−1 (.810) = .878.
4. (REVERSED NLS ESTIMATION) The next parameters to estimate are the cor-
responding population means of the first election. Estimate the reversed non-




















5. (PROJECTED TURNOUTS OF TWO GROUPS IN THE FIRST ELECTION) Again,
compute the estimated projection of turnout in the two groups in the first
election:
















Note that the turnout in the group that consists of more educated voters are
significantly lower than that in the other group. With these results, we may
estimate the second set of parameters,
µ̂x,1 = Φ−1(.611) = .282
µ̂x,0 = Φ−1(.793) = .817.
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6. (CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS) The final parameters are the correlations in
the two distributions, which can be retrieved by the multiplication of the two










.496× 1.064 = .726.
As we can see, the correlation is much smaller for the group with higher edu-
cation which indicates that more electoral change is happening in the group.
7. (SUMMING UP THE TWO JOINT DISTRIBUTIONS) This finishes estimating
necessary parameters from the two bivariate-normal distributions as:




= N 21 [.282, 1.036; .165]




= N 20 [.817, .878, .726]
8. (FRACTION THAT VOTED IN BOTH ELECTIONS) Now the task left is to find
the fraction of voters in the two groups that voted in both elections. We can
compute the double integrals of the estimated distributions to find the frac-










N 20 [x∗, y∗|.817, .878, .726] dx∗dy∗ = .718.
To reiterate, 53% of educated voters in South Korea voted in both elections,
while 72% of the other voters turned out in both elections.
9. (FINISHING UP THE TABLE) Now fill in the fraction of the voters in the fol-
lowing three-way table, using the estimated total turnouts in each group.
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Highly Educated The Rest
The 1981 Election The 1981 Election
Voted NotVoted Total Voted
Not
Voted Total
The Voted 0.529 0.321 0.850 0.718 0.092 0.809
1985
Election Not Voted 0.082 0.068 0.150 0.075 0.115 0.191
0.611 0.389 0.793 0.207
Table 4.2: Estimated Distribution of Voters across Elections in Different Education Groups: South
Korean Elections 1981–1985
Note that the estimated quantities we already have are emphasized in the ta-
ble. For example, we have estimated turnout rates in the two groups in the
two election from Steps 3 and 4, which will enable us to define the marginal
probabilities in the table. Also, since we have estimated the fraction of two-
time voters in Step 8, the table is identified, and we may fill in the table in an
obvious way.
10. (LOYALTY AND DEFECTION RATES: THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES)
Since loyalty rates and defection rates as defined in previous chapters are
conditional probability terms, that is, the probability that a first time voter
will return to the polling booth in the next election, the fractions can trivially
be transformed into such rates. By dividing the fractions with the marginal
turnout rates in the 1981 election, the voter transition rates can be retrieved
and are shown in Table 4.3:
Among other things, Table 4.3 makes an interesting point on the estimated rate
of more educated voters newly entering the election in 1985. It tells that around
83% of more educated non-voters in the previous election newly turned out in the
1985 election, perhaps because they were more responsive to the electoral climate
than the rest of the voters. The rest of the chapter looks into the question of how
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Highly Educated The Rest




The Voted 0.866 0.825 0.905 0.444
1985
Election Not Voted 0.134 0.175 0.095 0.556
Table 4.3:
Estimated Transition Rates in Different Education Groups: South Korean Elections 1981–
1985
the democratization movement in South Korea made an impact on the electoral
participation of the voters by examining aggregate data and applying the model I
have developed so far.
4.3 Application: The Impact of Democratization on Voter Turnout
4.3.1 Introduction
The year 1987 marks an important point in time in South Korean political his-
tory. After a series of authoritarian governments that ruled the country from the
1960s, the government conceded to the massive protest and wide-spread demand
of the citizens for democratic changes, including restoration of civil rights, amend-
ment of the constitution to ensure more democratic elections, and other political
reforms (Han 1988; Oh 1999). The presidential election that was held at the end of
the year was the first direct, competitive contest since the 1972 election.
If there ever was an election in South Korea that can be called a “critical” elec-
tion in the same sense as V. O. Key (1955) defines, it is the 1987 election. Elections
afterward showed voting patterns that were not existent before: including mas-
sive levels of regional voting pattern and high levels of partisan votes. In short,
the democratization induced a critical electoral realignment.
Realignment, simply defined, is a systematic and enduring change in electoral
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preferences of the electorate over time. To study realignments, the researcher
should naturally look into the change in partisanship or electoral support of vot-
ers. However, an equally, if not more, important aspect of electoral realignments
is whether and why new voters are mobilized into the political arena and who
they are. Change in the electoral environment or an issue that newly becomes
salient may attract non-voters to the polling both, and if such new voters are sys-
tematically favoring one party over other parties, they will constitute a central
component of the electoral realignment.
In this vein, the dynamics of voter participation takes on an important meaning
in understanding the electoral politics in South Korea. The democratic reform of
the country—a system-level change with a profound impact on the political life of
the voters and politicians—should entirely alter how people perceive politics and
how political parties mobilize them: that is, who starts to vote and whom they
vote for.
Authoritarian regimes will alienate certain groups of citizens, and as the lit-
erature on participation and political efficacy suggests, we may expect a system-
atic influx of such voters into the electoral arena when such regimes reach their
demise. Democratic reform however may also trigger the vanishing of traditional
mobilization mechanisms. This will necessarily result in the decrease of turnout,
and more importantly, the weakening of support for candidates and parties who
have benefited from such mobilization networks and connections of the authori-
tarian government.
This section focuses on how the democratic reform in South Korea attracted
voters that were formerly uninterested in the authoritarian regime, and how such
voters are aligning into the new party system. Of course, it is not to say that such
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influx of new voters is the one and only cause of the emergence of the new party
system, but I argue that it constitutes a major part of the electoral realignment.
In this chapter, I simply try to answer the following questions: first, did the de-
mocratization of the country attract new voters into the political arena? If so, who
are they, and what are the consequences of such new voters? And finally, what
caused such systematic movement in the electorate?
The following section sets up the background on the dynamics of turnout in
South Korea. A simple adaptation of the voter transition setup will be applied to
model the entrance and exit rates of the voters.
4.3.2 Background: The Dynamics of Voter Turnout in South Korea
The dynamics of voter turnout in South Korea, especially focusing upon the
elections around 1987, shows that there are several complex story lines. Figure 4.2
shows the overall trend of national voter turnout in presidential, legislative, and
local elections.
First, it is quite obvious that there is a short-term effect of democratization on
turnout rates: the turnout rate in the 1987 presidential election, which is around
89%, is higher than any previous election since the 1970s; turnout in the National
Assembly elections peaks in 1985—a widely contested election that triggered the
democratization movement. However, it should be noted that turnout decreased
by about 10 percentage points in the 1988 National Assembly election that took
place a year after democratization. There is also a long-term trend of decline in
turnout after the democratization of the country.












Figure 4.2: Turnout in South Korean Elections
political efficacy and participation, the democratization of a political system should
facilitate higher turnout. The literature is quite clear on the relationship between
participation and political efficacy: alienated voters are less likely to vote. For
example, Luttbeg and Gant (1995: 134–136) distinguish between internal and ex-
ternal efficacies, and highlight that both strongly contribute to the voter turnout.
The case in point here is that we may expect an increase in turnout in a more
democratic regime (external efficacy), and especially from internally efficacious
voters with more political resources.
Meanwhile, as the literature on voter mobilization and participation claims,
there are reasons to expect a decrease in participation after the democratization of
the country, since the ruling party lost its edge in mobilizing voters. (For exam-
ple, see Rosenstone and Hansen 2002.) More specifically, under the authoritarian
regime, there was a strong connection between local wards of governing parties
and local governmental offices, which enjoyed uncontested and effective voter
mobilization, usually in the form of strong turnout drives. Abolition of such prac-
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tices, or guarantee of the neutrality of local governmental offices, was one of the
main focuses in the discussion of democratic reform, and by the 1987 presiden-
tial election, old mechanisms of voter mobilization would not work for the ruling
Democratic Justice Party.2
In short, there is no simple trend in turnout rates after democratization that
we may expect at the national level. It is fair to summarize that the change in
the mobilization patterns and the level of political efficacy affects turnout in op-
posite directions and cannot easily be separated although we may postulate that
there is a short term increase and a long-term decline. And of course, there is no
individual-level survey data from this period to look into this question.
4.3.3 Examining Entrances and Exits
Figure 4.3 depicts the possible consequences of changes in voter turnout. In
times of changes we would observe higher rates of voter replacement, which
could be defined by the proportion of voters who newly enter or do not anymore
come to the polling booth. The apparent questions are: who exactly are “entering”







Figure 4.3: Replacement of Voters
2See Donga Ilbo [Donga Daily] (Feb. 1985) on the turnout drive lead by the government. Due to the accuracy of the citizen
census register that the government holds, it was possible to identify exactly who voted and who did not. Also, see the
discussion on the change in the organization of local party wards.
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A direct adaptation of the voter transition model will allow us to investigate
the turnout rates in the two elections before and after 1987. We may rewrite the





where T1987 and T1985 indicate turnouts in the two consecutive elections. The “en-
trance” rate will be the usual defection rate and the “exit” rate will be one minus
the usual loyalty rate.
1985 Election
Vote Not Vote
1987 Election Vote 0.878 0.782
(0.875, 0.881) (0.768, 0.795)
Not Vote 0.122 0.218
(0.119, 0.125) (0.205, 0.232)
N = 3922
Note: Aggregate turnout rates in the two elections were 81% (1985) and 86% (1987).
Table 4.4: Voter Transition Rates Around Democratization
Table 4.4 shows the estimated entrance and exit rates retrieved by the Thomsen
estimator. Entries in the parentheses represent the 95% confidence interval of the
estimates, as was defined in Achen (2000) and discussed in the previous chapter.
We see that about 12% of the previous voters did not vote in the 1987 election,
while 78% of the previous non-voters came to the polling booth in the election. If
the causes that systematically determine who votes and who does not are working
in both elections, we should see a clear pattern of consistently high coefficients on
the diagonal entries: voters will continue to vote, and non-voters will stay that
way. Of course, since this is a time when a major electoral earthquake is taking
place, we see a sizable proportion of the previous non-voters coming to vote in
the first election after democratization.
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Table 4.5 reports such entrance and exit rates in multiple elections in South
Korea over time. The table provides an overlook of the composition of the voter
turnout in the elections and will be a baseline estimation for the analysis in the
next section.
First of all, consider the entrance rates for legislative elections over time. It
becomes apparent that there is a significant number of new voters coming into
the electoral system in the mid-1980s and into the early 1990s. Also, we note that
the exit rates are kept quite small until the 1988 election, meaning that once the
voter turns out, she mostly stayed a voter. This trend changes somewhat in the
later elections where we see a significant number of voters consistently exiting the
elections.
Another important point we observe is that the initial transformation in the
pattern of who votes and who does not first started in the 1985 election, not after
1987. This is consistent with what was shown in Figure 4.2 and with what we
know about the 1985 election, which featured a strong opposition party fielding
competitive candidates that was a rarity in South Korean elections for many years.
In a way, the results show that the democratization movement in 1987 was not
a political episode that suddenly erupted, but there already was an underlying
movement in the electorate that showed a surge in turnout.
Transition rates between presidential elections are less subtle. In the first two
elections right after 1987, the majority of previous non-voters turned out in the
elections. As it reaches down to more recent years, the entrance rate dropped
down while the exit rate climbed up. In any case, the presidential elections picture




Year Enter Exit Year Enter Exit
1978 0.439 0.131
1981 0.341 0.102
1985 0.504 0.077 1987 0.782 0.121
1988 0.321 0.171
1992 0.385 0.167 1992 0.617 0.143
1996 0.219 0.210 1997 0.514 0.134
2000 0.192 0.206
Note: Estimates for the 1987 Election was retrieved in comparison to the 1985 Election.
Table 4.5: Entrances and Exits from the Polling Booth
4.3.4 Unpacking the Entrances and Exits
A. Mobilization and the Turnout of Urban and Rural Voters
Based on our setup, we are ready to examine the entrance and exit rates in
different demographic groups. Since we are interested in “identifying” the voters
who are newly coming into and leaving from the electoral arena, it requires us to
employ the technique developed earlier in this chapter.
Here I first start out by comparing the entrance and exit rates of the rural and
urban voters. It should be noted that this round of estimation was carried out on
two separate geographical samples—thus we may infer the rates as those of the
urban voters and those of the rural voters. The important point to consider before
examining the results in the table is the possible impact of the change in mobi-
lization patterns. It can be assumed that former mobilization mechanisms were
more concentrated in the rural areas, and we may see how the turnout patterns
change over time there. Most importantly, we should observe lower exit rates and
higher entrance rates in rural areas before 1987. After democratization, we can
expect abrupt changes in such patterns—where we would start to observe higher
exit rates and possibly lower entrance rates of the rural voter.
Table 4.6 presents estimated entrance and exit rates of the rural and urban vot-
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Year Enter Exit
Urban Rural Diff Urban Rural Diff
Legislative 1978 0.448 0.614 -0.167 0.170 0.143 0.027
Elections 1981 0.366 0.576 -0.210 0.144 0.139 0.005
1985 0.580 0.501 0.078 0.101 0.084 0.017
1988 0.321 0.323 -0.001 0.187 0.159 0.028
1992 0.496 0.401 0.095 0.237 0.112 0.125
1996 0.535 0.309 0.226 0.379 0.188 0.190
2000 0.372 0.236 0.136 0.342 0.176 0.166
Presidential 1987 0.793 0.710 0.083 0.124 0.116 0.008
Elections 1993 0.557 0.645 -0.088 0.140 0.145 -0.005
1997 0.485 0.515 -0.030 0.123 0.141 -0.018
Table 4.6: Entrance and Exit Rates in Urban and Rural Districts
ers in several legislative presidential elections. Among many things in the table,
we first observe larger entrance rates of the rural voters than their urban counter-
parts before the 1985 election—something that is consistent with the strong mo-
bilization in the rural areas. This changes rapidly while we move down to later
legislative elections where we see the entrance rates are almost always (except the
case of the 1988 election) larger in urban areas. We observe that the rural entrance
rate goes down slowly and never recovers to the level above the urban rates in
legislative elections, after which it stabilizes. In other words, the recruitment of
new voters is now far less effective in the rural areas than it once was.
The exit rates in legislative elections tell a slightly different story. Arguably,
the exit rates in the two areas were comparable until the 1992 election, where
the urban exit rates took off. Contrary to what we speculated—that the lack of
mobilization would result in an immediate release of rural voters—it stays well
below the level of urban exit rates. Still, we see a gradual increase in exit rates in
rural areas, which may be the long-run effect of the changes in the mobilization
pattern. In any case, the extraordinarily large exit rates in the more recent elections
are directly related to the rapid decline of overall turnout in recent elections that
was shown in Figure 4.2. The results above indicate that the decline in turnout is
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heavily driven by the urban voters and less by rural voters.
To summarize, it seems to be the case that the impact of democratic reform—
here, essentially the cut-off of previous mobilization structures—had an immedi-
ate impact on how new voters were recruited in the rural areas. Democratization
did not immediately drive away the voters: but gradually and in a couple of elec-
tions voters were moving away from the polling booth at an astonishing rate,
especially in urban areas. An overall comparison between urban and rural voters
in legislative elections reveal that the urban turnout is always much more volatile
then that of the rural voters. Especially in post-democratization elections, both
the entrance rates and exit rates are larger in urban areas, indicating more urban
citizens are coming in and out of the polling booth, making them less consistent
voters.
Presidential elections tell a different story. In both areas, the movement of the
voters are volatile with larger entrance rates, and there are not many distinguish-
able patterns in the three elections, perhaps except the fact that the urban-rural
difference diminishes in these elections. Again, this could be due to the fact that
we only have three observation points, all of which being “high-profile” elections.
But we may learn from a non-finding here: when stakes are high, urban and rural
voters behave similarly. Now we look into other demographic attributes.
B. Estimated Turnout Among Different Groups
While the previous section was able to address the question of political mobi-
lization by dividing the observations into different types of geographic units, the
question of political efficacy will be more complicated. For example, it is possible
to argue that the particular type of mobilization under the authoritarian regimes
in South Korea was targeted at specific types of geographic areas, while attributes
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such as voter efficacy are truly individual-level characteristics. It would require
a full-fledged individual level election study that investigates deep into the psy-
che of the voters to get a good sense of the interaction between voter efficacy and
turnout in South Korea. Additionally, since we are interested in the dynamic as-
pect of the relationship around the democratization period, a perfect data set to
address the question would consist of at least several panels around 1987. In this
section, we approach the problem with aggregate demographic information and
try to depict the impact of democratization on turnout through voter efficacy.
Ecological estimates shown in this section require even stronger assumptions
to hold true, and sometimes, the estimations are less than stable. As was sketched
and discussed in previous sections, there is still more work to be added for the
improvement of the estimator. That said, the following analysis will show that
the ecological inference strategy developed in this chapter can be used here to
address the question of the impacts of covariates (demographic information) on
turnout, and more specifically, on entrance and exit rates.
Figure 4.4 is a good place to start. Entries are estimated turnout rates of selected
demographic groups, which was retrieved by the sample predictions shown in
equation (4.14) after estimating equation (4.24) with nonlinear least squares. The
exact figures are available in the appendix at the end of this chapter. The covari-
ates (Zj) here would indicate the demographic composition of the unit, say, pro-
portion of young voters. Essentially, the estimates are predicted turnouts of ho-
mogeneous groups—for example, young voters—and will provide insights into
how one can look at the dynamics of turnout in South Korean legislative elections
over time.
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Turnouts in Legislative Elections, Selected Demographic Groups
the turnouts here are computed from the data directly—after the matching of the
units over time and joining them to census units, the data had to go through a
process of dropping some problematic units3. The rate hovers around mid 70%
before the 1980s, and peaks at the 1985 election. After 1985, we see a continuous
and rapid decline in turnout rates. The task here is to decompose the turnout in
different demographic groups.
The demographic variables I investigate here are: 1) the percentage of young
voters in their 20s and 30s at the time of the election; 2) the percentage of older
voters who are in their 50s and above; 3) the percentage of voters with higher
education defined by those with college or above education; and 4) the percentage
of Christians.
The estimated turnout of high-education voters starts out with a fairly low level
of estimated turnout—at around 48% which is about 25% lower than the national
3Joining geographic units from different sources of data sets will always create problems. For example, the boundaries
can change over time or maybe are just defined differently. Merging adjacent units and aggregating them sometimes will
help—cases that I was not able to salvage through this process were dropped. Also, sometimes it is the case that certain
geographic units go through drastic population changes. Units that more than doubled in population and that lost more
than half of their population were also dropped in the cleaning process.
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turnout. At the time of the important 1985 election, the estimated turnout of voters
with high education reaches its peak at around 85%: in fact, the estimated turnout
is higher than that of any other demographic groups we have in the analysis. The
turnout afterward declines and stays in the mid-50%.
A similar pattern can be found in the young voter category: it starts at the mid
40% level; peaks at the 1985 election; and rapidly dies down. The difference from
the previous group of people is that the projected turnouts drop down even more
radically where it hits the mid-30% mark by the 2000 election.
As was argued previously, these two groups of voters would have been the
most alienated and/or uninterested voters under the authoritarian regime, and
we can understand why they display the lowest estimated level of turnout before
1985. It is interesting to note both groups reach their peaks in the 1985 election:
not just compared with their turnout level in other elections, but it marks the only
time when the estimated turnout among young and highly educated voters record
a higher turnout than the national average.
The fast decline—faster than other groups—in the estimated turnout also re-
veals an interesting point. In the short term, the 1988 legislative election which
took place after the 1987 presidential would display a sharp decline of estimated
turnouts among the young and highly educated voters. This could be due to the
after-effect of the 1987 presidential election where the candidate from the tradi-
tional ruling bloc, Roh Tae Woo, would finally win the electoral contest flattening
down all the heightened expectations. In any case, we see that the “critical” leg-
islative election was the 1985 election, not the 1988 election.
In the long run, we see the continuous decline of turnout over time, especially
among the young voters, since 1985. We note that the overall decline in turnout
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is mainly driven by the low turnout of young voters which has consistently been
dropping. The estimated turnout for the highly educated holds at around the
mid-50%, which distinguishes it from that of the young voters. We will see the
difference between the two demographic groups when it comes to looking at their
respective entrance and exit rates.
An interesting pattern emerges when we look at the estimated turnout of the
“old” voters. It essentially starts at around 98% in the 1973 election and remains
to be the highest estimated turnout group except in the 1985 election. It reaches
another peak in the 1992 election before showing some decline in later elections.
C. Voter Efficacy and The Dynamics of Turnout
So far, we have described the projected turnout rates among different groups
of voters. In this section, we conclude our investigation into the impact of democ-
ratization on the turnout of South Korean voters by looking at the estimated exit
and entrances rates of voters from different demographic groups.
As was constructed earlier, we want to study the entrance and exit rates among
different demographic groups, and see how differently they reacted to democ-
ratization. As theory would suggest, we expect to observe larger entrance rates
around democratization among those who who would have been politically alien-
ated and who would feel politically more efficacious in the post-democratization
era. Particularly, those with higher education (political resources) and the young
voters (democratic values) would be a good example.4
Figure 4.5 plots the estimated entrance and exit rates of the three different de-
mographic groups, namely, those with higher education, those in their 20s and
4See J. H. Rhee (2001) for the political efficacy arguments; Jung (2000) has an interesting discussion on the “Democrati-
zation Generation.”
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30s, and those who are over 50. The plots partially confirm what we expect, and
at the same time provide some new insights. More detailed figures with other
demographic variables are in the appendix that can be found at the end of this
chapter.
First of all, there is no question about whether there was a “shock” to the elec-
toral system in 1985 that had a profound impact—at least a short-term effect. We
observe surges of entrance rates in both the young voter group and the high-
education group at the time; exit rates are the lowest for both groups as well.
Secondly, we are left to wonder whether this “shock” that was created by de-
mocratization had any lasting impact. Both groups of voters immediately go back
to their pre-democratization levels of entrance and exit rates. One noticeable long-
run trend is the drop in entrances and surge of the exit rates, especially among the
young voters, but we cannot be sure that this is the direct impact of democrati-
zation. In any case, we note that the overall decline of turnout among the young
voters that we have seen in Figure 4.4 in fact is a function of both the drop of the
entrance rate and the surge of the exit rate in elections after the 1985 election.
Most interestingly, the impact of democratization can be seen in the older voter
group as well. Generally, this is a group of people with very stationary turnout
patterns, as can be seen by its minuscule exit rates in the second sub-figure of
Figure 4.4: elderly voters consistently turn out to vote. The only time this is per-
turbed is in 1985 and 1988 which indicates that a significant amount of these voters
stopped coming into the polling booth. Combine this with the sudden surge in the
entrance rate of the “old” group around 1988. This indicates that a new batch of
older voters was absorbed into the system while a significant chunk of them left
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(b) Estimated Exit Rates
Figure 4.5: Estimated Entrance and Exit Rates by Education and Age
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4.3.5 Discussion
The above analysis on South Korean elections highlights several important
points around the democratization period that have not been empirically investi-
gated before. First, it was the 1985 National Assembly election, not the 1987 pres-
idential election, that was the critical election to define the post-democratization
realignment. In fact, it was centered around a certain group of voters that initiated
the start of such immense political transformation through an election that took
place two years before democratization.
More specifically, the group of voters with more political resources to participate—
the more educated, the younger, those who live in urban areas, and most impor-
tantly, those who chose not to participate in previous elections under the author-
itarian regime—suddenly decided to participate and were able to create a solid
opposition against the government. An apparent explanation is that there were
underlying political demands for more democracy all along, and it somehow so-
lidified as a political force in the 1985 election and was instrumental in the democ-
ratization movement.
Second, consistent with the literature on electoral mobilization, this movement
was later sustained by the institutional reforms in 1987. As seen in the analysis
above, a long-term drop of turnout in rural areas with high exit rates is likely to
be due to the demise of the local wards of the governing party and is a continuing
trend.
Third, the initial impact around democratization wears off among the voters
with more political resources, but they continue to show higher turnout rates and
voice their opinions in presidential elections more effectively than their counter-
parts.
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Finally, the observations are consistent with the comparative democratization
literature on the relevance of the civil society in its role in democratic transforma-
tion. As seen in the section above, we see a clear pattern where an underlying
demand for political reform is first manifested by a group of middle class voters
in an election. As the social structure went through a gradual change in the 1970s,
the middle class gained political weight in South Korea. Their political demand
was expressed, among other channels, in the 1985 election, which later would
become a precursor to the democratic reform of the country.
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Appendix: Estimation Group Turnouts, Entrance and Exit Rates
Table 4.7: (Appendix) Estimated Turnout Rates by Different Demographic Groups in South Korean
Elections
Year Overall Educated Old Young Christian
Legislative
Elections 1978 0.741 0.482 0.988 0.455 0.781
1981 0.753 0.639 0.908 0.656 0.624
1985 0.819 0.850 0.798 0.833 0.743
1988 0.737 0.695 0.914 0.599 0.668
1992 0.716 0.543 0.998 0.470 0.719
1996 0.628 0.584 0.835 0.367 0.681
2000 0.569 0.529 0.727 0.351 0.534
Presidential
Elections 1987 0.861 0.917 0.790 0.933 0.873
1992 0.823 0.794 0.909 0.719 0.760
1997 0.797 0.848 0.781 0.814 0.909
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Table 4.8: (Appendix) Estimated Entrance Rates of Different Demographic Groups in South Ko-
rean Elections
Year Overall Education Young Old Christian
Legislative
Elections 1978 0.439 0.511 0.100 0.468 0.414
1981 0.341 0.568 0.200 0.080 0.580
1985 0.504 0.825 0.624 0.534 0.664
1988 0.321 0.644 0.200 0.817 0.360
1992 0.385 0.686 0.350 0.300 0.785
1996 0.219 0.637 0.363 0.020 0.560
2000 0.192 0.457 0.100 0.092 0.252
Presidential
Elections 1987 0.782 0.074 0.946 0.799 0.109
1992 0.617 0.201 0.339 0.797 0.230
1997 0.514 0.143 0.342 0.754 0.058
Table 4.9: (Appendix) Estimated Exit Rates of Different Demographic Groups in South Korean
Elections
Year Education Young Old Christian Overall
Legislative
Elections 1978 0.541 0.592 0.000 0.000 0.131
1981 0.322 0.694 0.019 0.365 0.102
1985 0.125 0.100 0.097 0.220 0.077
1988 0.292 0.322 0.191 0.228 0.171
1992 0.515 0.900 0.001 0.323 0.167
1996 0.442 0.850 0.056 0.245 0.210
2000 0.427 0.662 0.018 0.306 0.206
Presidential
Elections 1987 0.894 0.000 0.160 0.841 0.121
1992 0.756 0.379 0.111 0.698 0.143
1997 0.811 0.123 0.175 0.832 0.134
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
One of the most important themes of this dissertation is on testing ecological
inference techniques. As sketched out earlier, ecological inference strategies are
bound to make certain assumptions on the aggregation process that generated the
aggregate data. To be sure, these assumptions are not something that can be tested
directly, since the aggregation process is the hidden force that we do not observe.
Moreover, exactly due to this reason, it is hard to design a simulation study to
generate data that truly mimics real aggregation processes.
In this vein, testing ecological inference techniques to help the researcher find
or model the “right” estimator for the given problem is important. Since aggre-
gation processes are different, unique, and dependent upon the particular context
of the question and environment of the data, there is no general solution to eco-
logical inference problems, but only problem- and data- specific solutions. Hence,
it is important to put ecological estimation strategies to test by applying them
to similar questions with data where the truth is known or where corresponding
individual level analysis exists.
For the specific task of estimating voter transition rates from aggregate elec-
toral records, it is fair to conclude the estimator suggested by Thomsen outper-
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forms other ecological estimation strategies. For example, as I have illustrated
in the first chapter, the voter transition problem comes with difficulties such as
bigger-than-usual aggregation bias and severe nonlinearities that are generated
by features specific to electoral dynamics. In short, the results suggest that, when
it comes to the task of estimating voter transition rates, the Thomsen estimator
produces estimates that are far superior to those of conventional and more gener-
alized approaches, such as Goodman’s or King’s. This was clearly seen when the
estimator is applied to voter transition problems in several different contexts of
elections held in South Korea, Great Britain, and Florida.
It remains to be true that theory matters. Among the ecological estimators,
I find the micro-modeling of voter choices that underlie the Thomsen estimator
to fit the question and data the best, and accordingly is the best ecological voter
transition estimator we have, both in theory and practice.
It is in fact the theoretical strength of the Thomsen estimator that enables the
researcher to extend the voter transition question into more sophisticated prob-
lems. In Chapter 4, I proposed an extension of the Thomsen model that enables
the estimator to address questions on the correlates of voter transition, where the
researcher would be able to analyze heterogeneous transition rates across different
demographic groups. In the chapter, I provided examples regarding the turnout
of South Korean voters over time among different demographic groups. The ex-
tension is consistent with the micro-modeling of voters that the basic Thomsen
model outlined, with more possibilities of further extensions.
There are two future avenues to explore when it comes to the covariate model.
First, it is possible to imagine a more generalized extension of the model with
multinomial covariates. What was illustrated in the chapter typically contrasts
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transition rates of the voters in one demographic group against those from the
rest of the population. A slight extension of the logic seen in the chapter should
enable researchers to look at covariates that include more than two categories, for
example, several occupation groups. Barring instability that comes with small-
sized demographic groups, this definitely is an immediate possible extension of
the covariate model.
Another possible further extension is to consider an additional covariate that
taps a different dimension of the electorate other than the first covariate. For ex-
ample, it is possible to envision voter transitions across elections as a function of
class and age, where the question would involve comparing the transition rates
among, say, young workers and older workers. Conceptually, this will involve a
joint-mixture of the bivariate transition distributions, but implementing the model
would require further theoretical work.
Chapter 3 proposed an application of the iterated proportional fit (IPF) exten-
sion that enables the estimation of transition rates in a multiparty system. As it
turns out, the method is simple, general, and provides estimates that are more
reliable than those from existing approaches. More theoretical work on how IPF
is related with the literature on multinomial choices is in order, which will enable
us to develop the model into a more generalizable solution.
Still, at the current stage, the technique is simply an adjustment process ap-
plied after the first-round estimation that provides initial values of IPF. It remains
to be seen whether it is possible—or even desirable—to modify basic ecological
estimators and embed them in the constraints of IPF, to use the full information
in a simultaneous estimation. Or, perhaps it is the case that estimation of mul-
tiparty transition rates will have be built from the micro-models of multinomial
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choices and ad hoc solutions including IPF will have to be replaced by such theo-
retical models. Still, knowing whether and how individual models of choices can
offer insight into the ecological inference process would require more ingenuity
and further advances on our understanding of elections and voters.
The key motivation of both extensions shown in the dissertation is to learn
whether and how we can address substantively meaningful and interesting ques-
tions by overcoming the limitations that aggregate data present. For example, the
discussion on the realignment of South Korean voters shows that political the-
ories on the relationship between the civil society and democratization can be
empirically examined with aggregate data. Armed with the ecological inference
techniques developed here and applying them to more widely available aggregate
electoral data sets on various new democracies around democratic transitions, we
may conceive a new cross-national analysis agenda on comparative democratiza-
tion.
Even though there is a multitude of difficulties surrounding the ecological in-
ference process, the literature has advanced, if in small steps, toward providing
better instruments and analytic eyes to study topics in time and places where im-
portant questions abound but data are scarce. This dissertation is an attempt to
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